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This report looks at the prospects for economic integration between Ukraine and the
European Union. The so-called Orange Revolution of late 2004 saw the question of
Ukraine’s future geopolitical orientation re-emerge, and the idea of closer integration
with the EU received wide social support. Yet, already by mid-2006 the political
support to the idea of Euro-Atlantic integration seem to diminish. It is not clear if, how
and when the idea of deeper integration with the EU will be put into action. Although
the main steps have been charted at the official level (Ukraine becoming WTO member
and both sides start to gradually lower barriers to trade in manufacturing goods),
neither their timing, nor the steps going beyond them can be specified with any degree
of certainty. This report aims at showing the possible and optimal policy options.
Although the integration between the EU and Ukraine can be assessed from many
different angles, the team of researchers decided to concentrate exclusively on the
economic issues. The focus is on future policy options that will probably be relevant
during the next 5-10 years.
The report treats the EU and Ukraine in an asymmetric way. The perspective of
Ukraine and issues that are specific to the Ukrainian market are given the larger
share. The assumption is that the reader is less familiar with the current situation of
Ukrainian economy than with the general EU policies towards external partners.
However, common EU policies towards its neighbours and the challenges existing at
both sides are also outlined.
The report starts from giving a background of the EU-Ukraine relations. There follows the
assessment of the implementation of selected economic articles of the EU-Ukraine action
plan. The plan of action was drafted in late 2004 and signed in early 2005. The analysis
focuses on its main economic provisions, and the progress in respective spheres that has
been recorded from 2004 to date. The report looks at progress made in the opening of the
Ukrainian market, as well as in making it more friendly for local economic agents.
11
1
Introduction*
* The authors are grateful for comments and suggestions received from Marek Dabrowski and Michael Emerson.
Opinions expressed in the report should not be attributed to any of these persons and institutions they are affiliated
with. Sole responsibility for the content of this report rests with the editors and authors of respective sections.
The next part of the report takes more forward-looking approach. First, the
prospects for liberalising trade in goods and for the establishment of the free trade
zone in manufacturing between the EU and Ukraine are examined. Then the report
team looks at the possible mid-term solution that would go beyond the standard EU
FTA, such as: an enhanced free trade agreement and granting Ukraine wider access
to the EU internal market. The next sections examine the most challenging areas for
future integration, that is free mobility of labour and short-term capital. The
analysis is done essentially by inspecting what form of economic integration can be
the optimal one, taking into account both the possible effects of deeper cooperation
and mutual constraints. While investigating these, the team has been exploring
chances to lower barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital, and labour.
The last chapter concludes.
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2.1. Background
Ukrainian governments started to work on bilateral relations with the EU in the
early 1990s, about the time when Ukraine gained its independence. In 1993, the
Commission opened its Delegation in Ukraine and started negotiations on the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which entered into force in 1998
and became the framework in which EU-Ukraine relations have developed up until
present. Similar Partnership and Cooperation Agreements were signed with all
other states that emerged from the Soviet Union (except Baltic countries) and
aimed at encouraging democratic transition and market reforms in those
countries. Unlike Trade and Association Agreements that the EU concluded with
countries of Eastern Europe and Stabilization and Association Agreements
conclude with Western Balkan countries, PCAs did not envisage EU membership.
Neither it included any free trade provisions. 
The PCA between the EU and Ukraine declares a commitment to common values,
establishes a framework for political cooperation and sets objectives for bilateral
cooperation in different areas (trade, investment, cultural, scientific cooperation
etc.). Some provisions of the PCA are binding, notably those related to movement
of goods, services, labor and capital. Yet, overall, the agreement is rather a
declaration of intentions and does not specify clear mechanisms for their
achievement.
In practice, the objectives of cooperation have been implemented through annual
bilateral presidential Summits and ministerial Cooperation Councils, as well as
technical assistance, provided mainly through the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the
Commonwealth of Independent States) program. Over 1998-2004, the EU granted
Ukraine 838 million euro of technical assistance. Large part of this money (310
million Euros) was directed to nuclear safety program and to the Chernobyl Shelter
13CASE Reports No. 66
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Fund; with the rest being targeted for development of civil society, economic reforms,
regional development, education and other priority areas.
In 2003, the EU proposed a new framework for its relations with neighbours,
including Ukraine, called the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP
geographical coverage is quite heterogeneous and covers the east of Europe,
Caucasus and Southern Mediterranean. The current list of partners includes
Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.
Russia opted out of the ENP and instead seeks bilateral relationship with the EU
on more equal terms. 
The main idea of the ENP is to encourage stability, security and prosperity in the
neighbouring states without extending EU membership to them. The blueprint for the
ENP was outlined in the Communication on Wider Europe issued in March 2003 (EC,
2003), and then elaborated in the ENP Strategy Paper, adopted in 2004. To make the
ENP operational, the EU agreed with each ENP country a plan of action that specifies
priorities that should be realised in the short-to-medium term (3 or 5 years).
The EU-Ukraine action plan was drafted in late 2004 and signed in February 2005.
It is to be implemented over three years. The Plan sets priorities in different policy
areas and elaborates on what should be done to achieve them. In the economic
domain, these include WTO accession, removal of non-tariff barriers in bilateral
trade, improvement of investment climate, tax reform and approximation of
legislation. Both Ukraine and the EU monitor the implementation of the Plan and
exchange their opinions. According to the conclusions of the EU-Ukraine Summit
on 1 December 2005, Ukraine made a significant progress in implementation of the
action plan (see EC, 2005).
In 2008, both the PCA and the action plan expire. The EU and Ukraine decided to
negotiate a new framework agreement that is to replace the PCA. This will be the
opportunity to deepen the relationship. The EU is already using the language of an
‘Enhanced Agreement’, signifying a willingness to be more ambitious. It is clear that
this will be a new brand of multi-pillar agreement, embracing economic relations,
political values, justice and home affairs and foreign and security policy. For the EU
the economic content could consist of a ‘deep free trade agreement’, but it is not clear
at this stage whether the Yanukovich government will want to go ahead on this.
14
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2.2. EU-Ukraine economic relations:
basic facts and recent developments
According to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the parties should
adhere to GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) principles in their trade,
namely most favored nation clause, national treatment principle, freedom of transit,
and general prohibition of quantitative restrictions except for textile and some coal
and steel products and nuclear materials, on which special agreements were signed.
Trade in textiles has been fully liberalized since 2005. In the metal sector, however,
substantial restrictions remain: the EU establishes annual quotas for Ukraine’s
metal imports. Moreover, the EU has repeatedly imposed antidumping duties on
different Ukrainian metal products: so, in 2005, 10 Ukrainian chemical and steel
products were subject to EU safeguard measures1. In December 2005, the EU
granted Ukraine a market economy status, which is going to enhance the position
of Ukrainian companies in the antidumping cases. 
EU-Ukraine trade and investment have been on the rise, especially in the last
several years. In 2005 the EU was the second largest trade partner of Ukraine
(after CIS – the Commonwealth of Independent States) accounting for 30% of
Ukraine’s exports and 33% of its imports. Steel, energy and agricultural products
accounted for 50% of Ukraine’s exports to the EU, while equipment, machinery,
vehicles and chemicals constituted 54% of Ukraine’s imports from the EU. As of
the beginning of 2006, the EU was by far the largest foreign investor in Ukraine,
accounting for 71% of total FDI. 
However, EU-Ukraine trade relations are asymmetric. In 2005 Ukraine accounted for
only 1.2% of the EU’s total imports and 0.6% of its total exports. Such small share of
Ukraine in the EU trade, combined with the high significance of the EU for Ukraine’s
trade means that Ukraine will feel much stronger any benefits or losses from closer
economic cooperation than the EU. 
Since 2005, the EU shaped its economic cooperation with Ukraine mainly through the
ENP and the action plan. They, in particular, envisage further trade liberalisation between
the EU and Ukraine and a possibility of establishment of a free trade area (FTA). The EU
and Ukraine are currently (autumn 2006) investigating the feasibility and possible
consequences of concluding the FTA. The action plan suggests that FTA negotiations can
start as soon as Ukraine becomes a WTO member, which might happen in 2007. Another
keynote of the ENP in the economic domain is ‘a stake in the EU’s Internal Market’. This
effectively concerns the substance of a ‘deep’, rather than simple free trade area.
15
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1 Source: http://www.ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/eu/en/publication/content/2276.htm
Ukraine and the EU are also actively cooperating in several selected sectors, notably,
energy, transport, telecommunications and research. Ukraine is making preparations
to join the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE). The
action plan also envisages possibility of Ukraine’s participation in the joint
development of the Pan-European Corridors and Areas as well as in the TRACECA
program (a transport corridor between Europe and Asia). At the December 2005
Summit, the EU and Ukraine signed several memoranda that envisage gradual
16
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Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine
Figure 1. Geographical structure of Ukrainian trade, 1996-2005
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Source: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/datapdf.htm
Table 1. Composition of Ukrainian trade with EU, %, 2005
exports to EU imports from EU
100 100
Agricultural products 12.2 5.6
Energy 13.7 1.3
Non-agricultural raw materials 0 0.5
Office/telecom. Equipment 1.3 12.5
Power/non-electrical mach. 1.5 15.1
Transport equipment 2.5 10.8
Chemicals 6.5 15.3
Textiles and clothing 6.1 6.3
Iron and steel 23.6 0.7
TOTAL, EUR million 7666 13033
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine
Table 2. EU's FDI into Ukraine, USD million
  01.01.2004 01.01.2005 01.01.2006
Total 6 794 9 047 16 375
EU 3 805 4 946 11 746
EU share, % 56.0 54.7 71.7
integration of Ukrainian gas and electricity sector into the domestic energy market of
the European Union, deeper cooperation in the context of forming a single air space,
Ukraine's participation in the Galileo project and its involvement in realization of the
first EU Space Program. 
The following section of the report is dedicated to the analysis of the implementation
of the EU-Ukraine action plan up until the present (i.e. mid-2006), which is followed
by the section devoted to the discussion of possibilities for deeper cooperation.
17
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This section of the report analyses progress in the implementation of economic
provisions of the EU-Ukraine action plan. We try to cover all the major areas:
structural reforms, monetary and fiscal policies, trade liberalization, competition
policy, movement of people and capital. The analysis of each subsection starts from
the provisions of the action plan and then gives an assessment of the degree to which
these provisions have been met (these assessments are summarised in the bracketed
comments alongside ach section heading).
3.1. Functioning market economy
The EU-Ukraine action plan lists the following measures to be taken to establish a
fully functioning market economy in Ukraine:
• ensure free price-formation,
• eliminate inconsistencies in existing Economic and Civic Codes,
• improve investment climate by ensuring transparency, predictability and
simplification of regulation,
• carry out consultation with domestic and foreign economic operators to draw up
a work program for further implementation of regulatory reform,
• adopt and implement a system of impact assessment of regulatory measures and
prior notification of regulatory changes to economic operators.
By functioning market economy we understand an economic system where free
markets are guided by a free price system and government intervention is limited to
protecting property rights and maintaining a peaceful environment for the markets to
function. 
19CASE Reports No. 66
3
Implementation of economic articles
of the Ukraine-EU action plan
Price formation (worsened)
The period of Yulia Timoshenko’s tenure as a Prime Minister in 2005 was marked with
hard administrative interventions in economy. Government applied direct price
setting when trying to curb the growth of fuel prices. In April 2005 gasoline prices
increased by 15%. Refineries and traders explained it by the increase in the price of
oil. Ministry of Economy issued a decree (Ministry of Economy, 2005) that fixed
marginal wholesale prices via maximum trade surcharge of 13% and retail prices at
2.75 UAH per litre of diesel oil and 2.99 UAH per litre of gasoline. Prices were
liberalized on 25 May 20052.
Other measures of administrative pressure were used to regulate meat and sugar
prices. Yulia Timoshenko threatened regional governors with dismissal in the case
that no measures would be taken to set prices at the declared level. Besides, oil
refineries and meat producers underwent a series of check ups by the Antimonopoly
Committee as they were suspected of collusion. All these interventions had negative
impact on markets and undermined economic stability. Overall, the year 2005 can be
assessed as the period when administrative pressure on setting prices increased.
Inconsistencies in Commercial (economic) and Civic Codes
(no change)
Commercial and Civic Codes started to be effective on 1 January, 2004. The Civic Code
regulates relations between natural persons and legal entities; the Commercial Code
regulates relations between legal entities and the state. In fact the two codes apply to the
same domain, but they are heavily inconsistent with each other as well as with other
laws of Ukraine. As a result, this hinders further free entrepreneurial development and
causes many legislative disputes to arise. Besides, such inconsistencies serve as a
fertile soil to corruption
Since coming into effect up to now 30 drafts of the laws on amendments to Civic Code
and 9 ones to Economic Code have been considered in the Verkhovna Rada. These
amendments are not aimed at further liberalization in economic and social domains
and elimination of inconsistencies between the codes, but rather at resolving local
present-day issues. In view of urgent need to bring effective civic legislation to
practical needs, it is positive that the amendments are considered. However, the
drawback is that a non-systematic approach is applied.
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2 Following major political turmoil, which in turn undermined the credibility of the Prime Minister’s capabilities
to lead a reformist government.
Ensuring transparency, predictability and simplification
of regulation (improvement)
State deregulatory efforts for 2005 were outlined in the law ‘On Basic State
Regulatory Policy in Economic Activity’ as of 11 September, 2003 No. 1160. 
As initial stage of regulation simplification two President’s decrees (President of
Ukraine, 2005a, 2005b) defined an accelerated review of regulatory legislative rules. By
the end of 2005, a total of 9,430 regulatory acts had been reviewed and 4,940 acts of
these were cancelled. The majority of them were either outdated or ineffective because
in practice they had limited impact on economic activity. The next stage of deregulation
will require changes to regulatory legislation since there are still substantial barriers to
private sector development. Today, more than 1,500 various permits for economic
activity are valid in Ukraine and they are subject to more than 150 laws, about 500 state
decrees and at least 1,500 enactments of branch departments and local authorities.
We should also mention that a designated agency in regulatory policy, State
Committee of Ukraine on Regulatory Measures and Entrepreneurship, is not an
independent institution but is subordinated to the government at the same level as
other state bodies. Such a status undermines institutional capacity of the body. During
2005-2006 there was a set of initiatives to transform the Committee into National
Commission on Regulatory Policy and Entrepreneurship under direct President’s
control (President of Ukraine, 2005c, 2005d). We find it reasonable in terms of
obtaining independence from the Cabinet of Ministers.
Consultation with domestic and foreign economic operators
to draw up a work program for further implementation of
regulatory reform (negative balance)
In 2005 the new government and President of Ukraine declared their willingness ‘to
conduct dialog with business’. A series of round-table discussions, conferences and
presentations with participation of government officials, domestic entrepreneurs and
foreign investors took place. The events were aimed at revealing problems in
entrepreneurial environment and elaborating measures to achieve progress in
regulatory reform.
Despite declared intention to closely examine problems of business, in opinion of
many entrepreneurs no real dialog with power happened and now it is still difficult to
deliver regulatory inefficiencies to authorities.
What is more, some negative tendencies became visible in mid-2006, when the links
between the business lobbies and the executive power strengthened, with many
businessman supporting the Prime Minister party took vast majority of deputy
minister positions.
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A system of impact assessment of regulatory measures
(weak improvement)
Prior impact assessment of regulatory acts is provided by the law of Ukraine ‘On Basic
State Regulatory Policy on Economic Activity’ (Verkhovna Rada, 2003). In 2005
91.4% draft regulatory acts (against 81.7% in 2004) were previously assessed by its
authors (State Committee of Ukraine for Regulatory Policy and Entrepreneurship,
2005). Currently in order to improve the quality of the developed regulatory acts, the
drafts must be submitted to prior approval by State Committee of Ukraine for
Regulatory Policy and Entrepreneurship. Ministry of Justice refuses to register
regulatory acts without Committee’s approval.
However, the practice is not comprehensively applied. Impact assessment is largely
limited to qualitative analysis and very often economic effects of the regulatory
measures are not forecasted. Besides, there are still cases when very important
economic measures are introduces without prior assessment and public discussion,
like changes to 2005 budget in March 2005. 
Prior notification of regulatory changes to economic
operators (weak improvement)
According to Ukrainian legislation (Verkhovna Rada, 2003) central, regional and local
bodies of executive power must promulgate drafts of normative acts for public
comment. Regulatory decrees drafts and amendments must be publicized via web-
sites of regulatory bodies and other official mass media (Cabinet of Ministry, 2002,
President of Ukraine, 2005a). In 2005 the majority of central executive bodies fulfilled
the requirement, that is 89.9% of regulatory acts drafts were previously publicized
(compared to 78% in 2004).
But there are no unified standards on regulatory plans disclosure that causes
difficulties in access to the information. Hence, economic operators cannot effectively
foresee the changes and participate in regulatory activity of the bodies. 
Conclusions
In the last two years Ukraine has not shown much progress in establishing a fully
functioning market economy. Markets suffer administrative pressure and price
regulation. Regulatory environment is hardly predictable, although executive bodies
apply efforts to publicize information, conduct prior impact assessment of regulatory
measures and consult with entrepreneurs on further regulatory reform. The problem
is weak institutional capacity of regulatory bodies. Despite the abovementioned, in
December 2005 Ukraine got status of ‘market economy’ from the European Union and
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in February 2006 from USA. That achievement is due to cumulative changes in
Ukrainian economy during the whole period starting from 1990s until the present.
3.2. Monetary and exchange rate policies
Experts tend to agree that the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) lacks operational
independence and that the main regulatory act governing its activity should be amended
to allow the central bank more freedom in monetary policy conduct and financial sector
oversight. The assessment of the NBU independence, done for the purpose of this report,
is presented in the Annex 1, and the reader is directed there for details.
Along with these lines, the EU-Ukraine action plan specifies the primary goal of
monetary and exchange rate policy reforms as3:
• Strengthen the independence of the National Bank of Ukraine including, if
necessary, by amending the ‘Law on the National Bank’ so as to bring it in line
with EU standards.
The same target is settled in the Action Plan Implementation Measures for 20054.
Increasing NBU independence (no change)
The measurement of central bank independence based on the Cukierman index (see
Annex 1) suggests that neither the NBU, nor the Ukrainian government fully satisfy
the EU criteria for CBI, both ‘legally’ and de facto. The estimations of the Cukierman
index for Ukraine range between 0.42 and 0.69, with the estimate calculated for this
report of 0.52 being in the middle. The result could be interpreted as that ‘degree of
independence’ of the NBU is 52% from ideal.
Limited NBU freedom is noticeable even without resorting to a formal analysis. For
instance, in April 2005 the NBU pressed by the government sharply appreciated
nominal hryvnia exchange rate.
Another example may be given by the new draft law that should strengthen
independent formulation of the monetary policy. At the beginning of June 2006 the
President of Ukraine submitted to the parliament the draft of this law5 suggesting to
increase the term of office of the NBU governor from 5 up to 7 years. Besides, it
banned participation of politicians and Parliament members in the NBU Council. The
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3 Chapter 2.2, article 19.
4 The Government of Ukraine annually adopts the Action Plan Implementation Measures. The respective
measures for 2005 have been adopted by the Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of 22 April 2005 No.117
and for 2006 by the Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of 27 April 2006 No 243.
5 #1039, 05 June 2006.
draft law was rejected by the Parliament. We consider the draft law as quite
progressive and improving the NBU independence.
In 2005 and 2006 no actual steps were taken to enhance independence of the
Ukraine’s central bank. This is to say that no progress was made with implementing
the respective provision of the action plan.
Conclusions and recommendations
On the basis of the analysis presented in the Annex 1, and in the situation where the
central bank is heavily dependent on the executive bodies, it seems necessary that the
monetary and exchange rate policy in Ukraine is better managed. In particular, clear
determination of the monetary policy goal (whether inflation targeting or some other
regime) would make the whole policy better focused and more transparent. Breaking
the link between pure politics and decision making in the sphere of monetary policy
would add transparency to the procedures. Moreover, the cases when the governor of
the NBU is dismissed should be clearly specified in the law.
3.3. Fiscal policy and taxation
The EU/Ukraine action plan defines some general recommendations for fiscal policy
conduct and adaptation to EU standards. In particular, for fiscal policies it is
recommended to:
• reinforce fiscal sustainability, including by implementing tax reforms and by
taking measures to address medium-term trends in the pension system;
The achievements in this direction were rather modest. The good point is that
authorities noted the necessity to implement sustainability requirements. However,
the political instability does not give any chances to make practical steps in
construction of efficient medium-term fiscal policy. This section: i) describes the
attempts of the Ministry of Finance to reinforce fiscal sustainability, ii) draws the
picture of current problems in the pension system, which destabilise budgetary sector,
and iii) refers to recent changes in tax policy.
3.3.1. Fiscal policy conduct
Fiscal sustainability (weak improvement)
One-year budget planning has been the usual practice of the fiscal authorities of
Ukraine during the whole period of independence. In fact political situation
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(frequent dismissal of governments) did not allow efficient reinforcement of fiscal
sustainability. Moreover, every election additionally destabilized state budget and
particularly the pension fund. Only in the mid-2005 some steps were made in the
desired direction: in August 2005 the Ministry of Finance formed a department,
which was in charge of mid-term strategy and fiscal stability. In general it was
expected that about four years of election-free period will allow to develop and
maintain consistent mid-term fiscal policy.
Pension system (worsened)
Misbalanced pension system creates significant worries about mid-term
sustainability of public finances. The situation got even worse after a series of
pension rises of 2004 and 2005. In fact the Pension Fund ended the year 2005 with
the deficit of 5% of the GDP. The deficit was financed at the expense of transfers
from the central budget. The situation calls for the introduction of the ‘second pillar’
(a system of mandatory accumulation of funds at personal accounts). This would
limit bad practices in the future.
Till now Ukraine has the solidarity-based public pension system. Starting 2003,
voluntary ‘third pillar’ with private pension funds was introduced; however, the role
of the private funds is minor.
It should be noted that successful implementation of the ‘second pillar’ requires good
financial stance of solidarity-based system since the reform will create additional
deficit, and require tighter fiscal spending, which are hardly possible in the near
future. For this reason the introduction of the ‘second pillar’ (planned for the
beginning of 2009) seems to be unrealistic in the mid-term.
Meanwhile an improvement of the balance of the Pension Fund could be achieved
only through the reform of the solidarity-based system. In fact, Ukrainian
misbalanced demographic structure (2.5 working person per pensioner) create the
major problems in the pension system. The experts project even worsening of
demographic situation. It is expected that by 2050 there will be 1.2 persons of the
working age for every pensioner. The situation is aggravated by large pension
privileges. For efficient reform of the current solidarity-based system, it is essential to
increase de jure and de facto retirement age. Moreover, the privileged payments should
be reduced markedly or even abolished.
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Conclusions
Reinforcement of fiscal sustainability is a goal for a long-term future and could be
hardly implemented in the nearest perspective. Till now no real progress in this field
was achieved and recently the financial stance of pension system even worsened. In
fact there are two points in this issue that should be addressed: mid-tem budget
planning (for three or more years) and balancing pension system on long-term
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Box 3.1. Demographic trends in Ukraine as compared to other Central and East
European countries
Ukraine has the worst demographic situation in the whole Europe, even when compared
with similar countries. The recent negative population dynamics in Ukraine comes as the
result of three major factors: falling birth rates, increasing death rates (including over-
mortality of working age men), and worsening of migration balance. High morbidity and
mortality rates together with falling birth rates were behind the depopulation that started in
Ukraine in 1993. In recent years, Ukrainian birth rates have been the lowest among all the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia.
Note: Birth rates are per 1,000 of inhabitants.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003.
Figure 2. Birth rates in CEE, 1990-2001
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic Poland Russian Federation
Bulgaria Croatia Latvia
Lithuania Estonia Hungary
Romania Slovak Republic Slovenia
Ukraine
sustainable basis. Efficient implementation of these goals requires several years of
stable political situation and a strong political will of the authorities.
3.3.2. Taxation
The EU/Ukraine action plan lists detailed specific steps that should be taken in the
field of taxation. Therefore, here follows the separate section devoted to tax policy.
The major improvement was expected in VAT administration, and in the legislation
concerning excise taxes. In addition, it was recommended to implement a strategic
plan of the development of the State Tax Administration. 
The key inconsistency with the EU requirements concerns VAT and excise duties. In
particular the main discontent was evoked by large volume of privileges on VAT,
discrimination in the use of promissory notes and arrears on reimbursement of VAT for
exporters. The major arguments concerning excise were related to privileges for motor-
car construction and discriminatory rates for imported alcoholic beverages (wine). 
Adoption and implementation of VAT and excise-duty
legislation compatible with the PCA and WTO norms
(partial fulfillment)
Tax privileges on VAT and excise duties plus discretionary import duties on alcoholic
beverages were the major inconsistency with the EU requirements. In fact all
privileges were eliminated with the approval of the law ‘On amendments to the state
budget 2005 and other legislation’ in March 2005. In addition it was introduced
moratorium for five years on granting any privileges on VAT. 
The only point which is still unresolved concerns discriminatory rates for imported
alcoholic beverages (wine). In the mid of 2005 there was prepared a draft law which
suggested elimination of discriminatory rates; however, it was not even submitted for
consideration of the parliament since the political crisis and the new parliament
elections were on the focus. If the newly elected parliament works go smoothly, the
law will be approved in 2006-2007.
Compatibility of Free Economic Zones with WTO rules
and start of alignment of Ukrainian legislation on Free
Zones with EU legislation (fulfilled)
The major complaints about Free Zones were related to tax privileges which created
conditions for unfair competition. These distortions were eliminated in one go by the
law ‘On amendments to the state budget 2005 and other legislation’ in 2005. In
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practice, the zones were abolished. Thus the requirement is completely fulfilled. There
are risks at the moment (late-2006) that the Free Economic Zones will be brought back
to life. However, it is yet too early to expect this with high degree of certainty.
Elimination of discriminatory treatment (fulfilled)
In fact the issue of discrimination in usage of promissory notes was also resolved with
the approval of the law ‘On amendments to the state budget 2005 and other
legislation’ in March 2005. Before enterprises with foreign capital were not eligible
for usage of promissory notes which obviously created discrimination against specific
companies.
Elimination of VAT refund arrears (partial fulfilment)
The situation with VAT reimbursement continued to be quite complex: the volume of
VAT frauds was reduced; however, tough controlling procedures do not allow complete
elimination of VAT arrears. The core of the problem concerns VAT frauds and
corruption in the State Tax Administration (STA). As of the 1st July of 2006, the volume
of reimbursement of VAT arrears was about UAH4.6 billion and about UAH0.5 billion
were overdue. Till the end of 2004 the major volume of VAT arrears was created by STA
bureaucrats for the purpose of rent seeking. The existence of large arrears were handy
for the bribe seekers, for the reason that illegal reimbursement was simple to operate.
As soon as the government of Yulia Timoshenko came into power at the beginning of
2005, it started the campaign against illegal VAT reimbursement for exporters. In fact
the volume of VAT frauds reduced sharply; however, arrears were still observed. The
reason of the accumulation of new arrears was strict control on the whole chain of
value added. If someone claims for reimbursement of VAT, STA checks all the chain in
which the obligation occurred (invoices from the beginning of production process).
Therefore, starting from the beginning of 2005, VAT arrears were created due to long
bureaucratic procedures of antifraud control. In fact the STA steadily improves the
reimbursement procedures. Specifically, for simplification of procedures the STA tries
to use the ‘white list’ i.e. a list of enterprises that adhere to the taxation rules and
proved to be law-abiding taxpayers. The enterprises included in the list are eligible to
obtain VAT reimbursements without check-ups.
Improvement of the functioning of the State Tax
Administration (weak improvement)
Important requirement of the EU/Ukraine action plan is implementation of a
comprehensive strategic plan for the State Tax Administration. Virtually, Ukraine has
strategic plan of STA development till 2013. It predetermines modernization and
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reform of the institution. The key goals are an increase in the level of voluntary tax
compliance, creation of partnership relations between STA and tax-payers,
implementation of transparent and standardized methods of tax-payers servicing. The
STA created the department of development and modernisation to tackle this issue.
The department is in charge of the successful implementation of the strategy.
Conclusions
Adaptation of taxation system of Ukraine to EU standards showed up significant
progress recently. The main step in the direction was made after Orange Revolution
when Timoshenko’s government eliminated almost all tax privileges for sectors and
Free Zones. Also markedly improvement was achieved with fighting VAT frauds and
reduction of VAT arrears. 
Still in taxation area there is much room for improvement. Specifically, the State Tax
Administration requires reforms. In fact such issues like accumulation of arrears are
closely related to the administrative procedures within the STA. Moreover, there are
discriminatory rates for imported alcoholic beverages, which are expected to be
abolished by the new parliament.
3.4. Structural reforms
3.4.1. Progress in privatisation
Article 20 of the EU-Ukraine action plan stipulates to:
• implement privatization program, including large-scale privatization, and 
• increase transparency of privatization process.
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Box 3.2. Public finances and tax system of Ukraine
Budget system of Ukraine consists of consolidated budget, pension fund and three other minor
social funds. About 44% of GDP (2005) is redistributed through the budget and social funds.
Social spending and outlays on current needs take the major bulk of public expenditures.
Tax system of Ukraine includes 22 national taxes and 14 different local taxes. Despite large
number of various taxes and tollages there are only five taxes that give 90% of tax revenues
to the consolidated budget. In addition there are mandatory charges to social security funds
and pension fund. The most important taxes are VAT (20%), enterprise profit tax (25%),
personal income tax (13%) and pension fund charges (31.8%).
Legislative basis for privatization (no progress)
Neither the ‘Law on Privatization Program’ for the years of 2006-2008, nor the ‘Law
on the State Property Fund of Ukraine’ was adopted. The currently acting outdated
‘Law on the Program of Privatization’ for the years of 2000-2002 permits non-
transparent procedures for large-scale privatization, which were widely used in the
past. In the absence of a modern program of privatization adopted by the legislature,
selection of assets going to privatization remains non-transparent, and the respective
criteria remain vague. 
Large-scale privatization (dramatic worsening)
Privatization of large-scale state-owned enterprises was stopped. Minor stock
shares in previously privatized enterprises were successfully sold at the stock
market, with more than $100 million received in revenues (about 2.6 times increase
year-on-year, yoy). The share of 93.02% of Krivorizhstal’ steel works is a single case
of a majority stock in a large-scale enterprise sold during this period. However, this
case should be accounted separately, because the stock has already been sold at an
undervalued price in 2004, but then in 2005 privatization was declared void by
court for relatively minor and widespread violation. The end-result (higher revenues
and more transparent procedure while re-selling) is clearly favourable. However,
the procedure used for achieving it quickly was largely politicised, and if applied to
other already privatised assets (as initially advocated; see the section on ‘re-
privatisation’ below) would result in the worsening on investment climate.
Therefore, this tender is treated as an outlier in this report.
The other issue was that this outstanding deal has brought nearly 97% of total
privatization revenues in 2005. Outside of it, the revenues dropped more than twelve
times yoy. This trend continued in the first half of 2006, with no large-scale
enterprises privatized, and revenues constituted only about USD 32 million, four
times less than in 2005.
Transparency of privatization process (improved)
The ‘Law on the Program of Privatization for the years of 2000-2002’ assures that
the transparent privatization procedures for small-scale enterprises and minor
asset shares are implemented. Therefore, the lack of the large-scale privatization
has automatically improved overall transparency of privatization process. A single
large-scale deal of this period, re-selling of the Krivorizhstal’, was remarkably
transparent too.
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‘Re-privatization’ (largely worsened the overall situation)
After the ‘Orange Revolution’, there was an attempt of revision or even partial
reversal of large-scale privatization deals conducted in the previous years. It was
motivated by suspected unfairness and losses incurred due to the lack of
transparency and possible collusions. However, some non-transparent procedures
were stipulated by the law, while the fact of collusion can hardly be proved. At the
beginning of 2005 the threat of investigation of three thousands of deals announced
by the Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko initiated a massive campaign of complaints
and lawsuits on less-scale cases across the country. President Yushchenko tried to
calm down the panic of owners and would-be investors by reducing this number to
‘thirty or forty’, although still with no transparent criteria for selection. Starting from
May, 2005 he started distancing himself from re-privatization as such, however still
supporting a few particular cases. Perhaps, it was a reaction on the negative trends
in investments, augmented with growing protests against re-privatization among the
domestic experts and foreign political leaders. In effect, re-privatization campaign
ended with appointment of the Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov known as its
opponent. Still it was never officially condemned or even stopped, nevertheless a few
drafts of a respective law were prepared. 
As a result, the government has initiated the lawsuits against a few arbitrary
selected scapegoats for rather minor and widespread violation of privatization
procedures. Of them, only one, although the most important case (‘Krivorizhstal’)
was followed to the end.
Control over the state-owned assets (improved)
Comprehensive register of state-owned assets, including shareholding, was mostly
accomplished. Dividends paid on these assets increased dramatically in 2005, but
assessment of this fact requires an analysis beyond the scope of this report.
Conclusions
The overall balance of progress made in the field of privatisation since late 2004 is
close to being neutral. Although privatisation revenues in 2005 were high, the
number was mainly due to the individual transition, that required prior withdrawal
of the property rights of the earlier, politically-connected buyer. In spite of this,
privatisation sales were limited to minor assets, and the comprehensive
privatisation programme for the following years has not been adopted. However,
there is a progress in the control over the state-owned assets that should limit future
corruption possibilities.
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3.4.2. Banking regulation and supervision
The action plan stipulates to (Article 20):
• strengthen banking regulation and supervision and
• improve performance of the State Savings Bank (SSB).
Strengthening banking regulation and supervision
(not changed yet)
Strengthening of banking regulation and supervision, as a priority, indicates moving
to consolidated prudential supervision. During 2005-2006 the central bank had to
develop methodology of consolidated banking supervision. Apparently, this includes
combination of conventionally prudential supervision relying on prudential standards
and those based on risk management. The guidelines for this new approach are
offered by Basel II recommendations. Currently the NBU is at the stage of
development of the new methodology and training its personnel on the practicalities
of introducing risk based supervision. Namely, risk assessment methodology to be
used by bank inspectors is being finalized. At this point the authors of this report lack
expertise on the effectiveness of the methodology, as it is still under development.
The other issue is whether Basel II recommendations are optimal for Ukraine. These
are now mandatory for all EU owned banks’ consolidate balance sheets. However,
the requirements were judged as excessively burdensome for Ukraine’s other banks
in the recent report by CEPS (2006). Therefore (taking also into account the stage of
the development of the Ukrainian banking system), the efforts would be better
matched if concentrated on improving the independence and capacities of banking
sector regulators.
Performance of the State Savings Bank (improved)
Removing restrictions applied to SSB is another core direction of activities regarding
the second part of Article 20 of the Action Plan. The restrictions were imposed in mid
2003 as a part of conditionality under World Bank Development Loan. The limitations
included reduction of the SSB assets, limitations on deposit interest rates, etc. As of
March 2006 SSB still was the 7th largest bank in Ukraine according to assets and
capital size with statutory capital of some US$ 140 million.
In May 2006 the Ministry of Finance, the NBU and SSB signed the protocol according
to which all restrictions on activity of the latter were cancelled. Importantly, that during
the years restrictions were in force the financial stance of SSB has indeed improved: as
of the beginning of 2006 its capital was 7 times as high as that in 2003.
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3.4.3. Domestic securities market
The EU-Ukraine action plan speaks of:
• developing domestic securities market, and
• further improvement of regulatory and supervisory framework for non-bank
financial institutions.
Legislation regarding domestic stock market in Ukraine developed rapidly during the
last year. As a result, one may conclude that requirements of the action plan and
appropriate schedule from ‘main steps’ by the government were met.
Transparency of domestic financial market
(probably improved)
In March 2006 President Yushchenko signed the law ‘On Securities and Stock Market’,
which replaced the old law of 1991. Among many other innovations, the new law puts
stricter standards for information disclosure by public companies, increases capital
requirements for the market participants (including stock exchanges), introduces more
effective procedures of initial public and private offering of stocks, etc.
Development of domestic securities market (still to come)
In January 2006 the law ‘On Mortgage Bonds’ was enacted allowing financial
institutions to securitize their assets via pass-through mechanism (i.e. issuance of
bonds backed by pool of mortgage loans). Further, at the beginning of July
technical rules for issuing such securities, adopted the State Security Commission,
came into effect. Potentially, this law may be quite important for the market
because of high demand for mortgage loans due to high real estate prices in
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Box. 3.3. Large-scale entry of European banks into Ukraine
Ukrainian financial system is expected to undergo structural changes and develop rapidly
soon. This is for the reason that the year 2005 saw large-scale entries of European banks
into Ukraine (see also Box 3.5 on FDI in this report), which up to date was driven mostly by
domestic and Russian financial groups. This is also the insurance market that is supposed
to expand quickly, given the growing economy and market potential. The decision to really
open Ukraine for big foreign investments was a major aspect of the last two year's economic
policies and structural acts.
Ukraine (according to Ukrainian National Mortgage Association, Ukrainian banks’
mortgage portfolios amounted to UAH 10.6 billion or 7.4% of the total credit
portfolios as of the end of 2005). However, reliability of these securities is
questionable because of poor risk management procedures in Ukrainian banks and
inappropriate regulation of real estate market (recent scandals and frauds make
mortgage credits more risky for banks). Additionally, since most of the credits are
in dollar, it makes them more vulnerable to foreign exchange risk. Another
problem is lack of resources in domestic market. 
The development of legislation on derivatives has been slow. Up to date, the new draft
law on derivatives has not been yet re-submitted to the Verkhovna Rada. 
Unified register (not changed yet)
The Ukrainian government aimed also at the improvement of the register of securities.
The draft law ‘On the System of Depository Accounting of Securities’ is still waiting
in the Rada. It calls for cancellation of documentary form of securities, unification of
depository institutions (now there are two of them: registers and custodians),
unification of the process of keeping registers of joint stock companies, etc. This
should assist in fighting against double registers and help in protecting property rights
of shareholders. However, the draft does not mention the transition process from the
old system to the new one, which may paralyze the stock market for a while.
Additionally, the role of currently functioning commercial depository in the new
system is also unclear. However, at the moment (mid-2006), main problems of the
depository system (such as double registers, weak protection of ownership rights etc.)
still remain unresolved and these actions can hardly bring improvement.
Conclusions
Although many legislative efforts have been in place since 2004, their effects are yet
to be seen. They will most likely first show in improved transparency of the financial
market; as a result of stricter standards required by the new law. However, further
steps are needed in the sphere of legislation on derivatives and unifying registers. At
the same time, except for the above listed issues, other very important decisions
ought to be made. Specifically, the law ‘On Joint stock Company’ seems to be the
most important document regarding further development of domestic market of
financial services (for more details see below). Introduction of international
accounting standards has to be complementary, but not less important, action.
Broadly speaking, there is still much work to be done to boost the development of
domestic securities market. 
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3.4.4. Joint stock company law
According to the article 20 of the EU-Ukraine action plan adoption of a new Joint
Stock Company (JSC) law is required in order to:
• improve the definition of the responsibilities of directors, managers and
shareholders’ meetings, strengthening disclosure requirements, and increasing
the protection of minority-shareholder’s rights.
Joint stock legislation in Ukraine (no change)
However, the law is not adopted yet. In fact, during the last 6.5 years five different
drafts of this law were submitted to the Verkhovna Rada, but none of them was
adopted. All the submitted drafts were firstly admitted by the Rada Main Scientific
and Expertise Office but then rejected by the Rada itself.
Now, the law of Ukraine ‘On Business Associations’ (adopted in 1991) directly
regulates activities of joint stock companies. Also Civil and Commercial codes
(adopted in 2004) as well as the law ‘On Securities and Stock Market’ (adopted at the
beginning of 2006) regulate certain aspects of joint stock companies’ activities. The
law ‘On Business Associations’ has become obsolete and does not cover all the
contemporary problems of JSC. Its imperfectness is aggravated by discrepancies
between Civil and Commercial codes. 
Under absence of the JSC law, there are some attempts to improve corporate
governance in certain individual sectors. Specifically, the draft law #1040 (05 June
2006) mandates that new banks must be registered as join stock companies, any other
legal form is prohibited. Partially, some important topics (such as information
disclosure) are also covered in the new law ‘On Securities and Stock Market’.
However, it relates only to the public companies and solves only a small number of
problems in corporate governance. 
Recently, not only the action plan required the law to be adopted but also President’s
decree #300/2006 (10 April 2006) ‘Schedule of Top-Priority Actions towards
Investment Activities’ determines this law as the urgent one (the draft should be
developed and submitted to the Verkhovna Rada during the year 2006). However, as
one may witness, this important law has not been adopted yet.
Why the law ‘On Joint Stock Companies’ has not been
adopted yet?
Formally cited reason why all of the draft laws submitted during the past six years
were rejected in Rada, is that they did not intend to improve functioning of joint stock
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companies and protect stockholder interests. When rejecting the last three drafts even
this sentence was absent.
The true reason seems to be fear of big asset owners to lose their property rights and to
give more rights to minority shareholders. And that the big Ukrainian businesses are very
effective lobbyists. Virtually all draft laws excluded the so called ‘closed’ JSC as a
possible legal form, which is quite coherent with international practice. It entailed strong
objections of ‘the biggest owners of assets’: according to the State Commission on
Securities and Stock Market, there are approximately 36 thousand joint stock companies
in Ukraine 24 thousand of which are ‘closed’ and only 12 thousands – ‘open’. The biggest
commercial bank ‘Privat’, one of the biggest bear-beverage company ‘Obolon’, large
chemical industry ‘Azot’ are among biggest ‘closed’ JSC in Ukraine.
Consequences of the lack of the legislation
Above mentioned drafts of the law cover following key issues:
• Regulation of forms of organization of Joint Stock Companies: ‘closed’ vs.
‘open’ JSC;
• Securities of Joint Stock Companies (procedures of issuing, additional issuing);
• Dividends payment;
• Regulation of authorities of shareholders meeting and supervisory board;
• Procedures of decision making by shareholders meeting;
• Protection of minority shareholders rights;
• Information disclosure.
Some economic agents fear that adoption of this law may trigger corporate wars.
However, current situation, albeit seems to be ‘stable’, is characterized by systematic
problems of distorted relations within companies and sufficient protection to
investors is not guaranteed. Recent bright example was the conflict among big
shareholders (including the State) at Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant (NFP) in 2005.
Specifically, the plant was privatized in 2003 by Mr. Pinchuk, but this deal was
contested by the new government and 50%+1 of his shares were frozen by the court
decision in the middle of 2005. However, at the end it occurred that there were two
different registers of owners of NFP and even two different meeting of shareholders
were held. Final resolution of the conflict is still an open question. Another conflict
took place at the big metallurgical plant ‘Zaporizhstal’: major owners agreed to buy
out stocks from minor shareholders (who did not agree with additional issuance of
shares directed at joining of subsidiaries to the plant) at the price, which is several
times lower than on the market before the conflict.
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In fact, the new law may foster some redistribution of ownership in the economy, but
this should be only short term shock and long-term ‘equilibrium’ in relations among
owners and between owners and management will follow.
Poor corporate governance, bad protection of investors’ rights impede domestic stock
market development, foreign investments inflow as well. Reform of the pension
system also suffers as non-state pension funds have no many opportunities to invest
their resources into reliable assets.
Currently, the new version of the draft law may be discussed in the Verkhovna Rada,
authored by the Security Commission and Ukrainian Association of Investment
Business. The main difference is that the authors intends to hold ‘closed’ JSC, while
introducing ‘public companies’ with stricter requirements to them.
Conclusions
There have been no major change on the front of improvement of corporate
governance and protection of the minority shareholders’ rights. Not only the long-
awaited law banning the existence of ‘closed-stock companies’ have not been adopted.
Even if adopted, it would have to be accompanied by other changes in order to be
maximally efficient. This would include: the adoption of international accounting
standards, well-performing depository system, the development of derivatives market,
clear policy as to financial markets development, tax reforms, elimination of
discrepancies between the Civil and the Commercial codes, etc.
3.4.5. Land code
The EU-Ukraine action plan addresses the problems of land sales and specifically
restrictions on non-agricultural land ownership for enterprises with foreign capital.
To resolve this problem it is suggested in the action plan to:
• Adopt the accompanying legislation necessary for the effective implementation
of the new Land Code. Remove current restrictions in article 82 of the Land
Code to non-agricultural land ownership by Ukrainian legal entities with
foreign stakeholders, including those with 100% foreign ownership.
The current version of Land Code (2006) restricts non-residents in purchase of non-
agricultural land. The foreigners are allowed to buy lands only in case of constructing
buildings and/or purchasing real estate. The same limitations are imposed on
enterprises with foreign capital. Important, legal entities (residents) with 100%
foreign ownership are not allowed to buy land at all.
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Abolition of restrictions on land ownership and creation
of land market (no change)
The action plan requires abolition of the current restrictions on land ownership.
There is a draft law ‘On introduction of changes to Land Code of Ukraine regarding
sales of land to enterprises with foreign capital’. According to the draft law legal
entities with 100% foreign ownership become eligible to purchase non-agricultural
land with restrictions (the same as for non-residents). However, the law was not
approved yet.
Additional requirement of the action plan concerns creation of legislation basis for
land market. The draft law ‘About land market’ was already developed. The document
defines the basic principles of land market formation. Still the document was not
approved by the parliament.
3.5. Company law and establishment
The major requirement of the action plan in the area of company law is creation of a
favourable environment for company establishment and not to discriminate between
foreign and domestic companies. In particular, Article 33 demands
• adoption and effective implementation of competition and bankruptcy
legislation;
• implementation of most favoured nation treatment regarding company
establishment, in particular, national treatment for EU companies and theirs
Ukrainian subsidiaries; 
• stable conditions for investment;
• progressive removal of restrictions on company establishment 
• effectiveness of a central coordinating body facilitating establishment of a
company
Permit system (positive record, but could be better)
In 2005, Ukrainian authorities made significant progress in the area of regulations of
company establishment. The most important was the adoption of the ‘Law of Ukraine
on Business Permit System’ (Verkhovna Rada, 2005b) that laid fundamental
principles of state policy in the sphere of business permits. Among other things, the
law simplified permitting procedure and defined administrative liability of
government officials in case they break the rules. Adoption of the law was among the
priority measures that the Ukrainian Government envisaged in its Activities on
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Implementation of the EU-Ukraine action plan. Yet, implementation of the law has
been so far unsatisfactory: government agencies have not prepared supplementary
documents stipulated by the law, in particular regarding the abolishment of permits
and reduction of permit fees. Moreover, the law demanded that the government
should conduct a legislative monitoring and make conclusions regarding the necessity
of certain remaining permits, which it has not done. 
Bankruptcy procedures (no progress) 
Ukraine has a fairly good bankruptcy law, called ‘The Law of Ukraine On Restoration
of Debtor Solvency or Declaration of Bankruptcy’, which came into force in 2000. It
was repeatedly improved over last few years, yet some problems remain. In
particular, there exist another law – ‘On Moratorium for Mandatory Sale of Assets’,
adopted in 2001 – which substantially restricts the disposal of assets of state-owned
enterprises in which the state share constitutes 25% or more. As a result, creditors
find it quite difficult to sell assets of such companies during the bankruptcy
proceedings. Another drawback of the Bankruptcy Law is that gives priority to state
tax bodies over other creditors in the order of satisfying creditor claims, which means
discrimination of creditors. Over the period considered (January 2005-July 2006) no
changes in laws relating to bankruptcy procedures were adopted. 
Changes in investment conditions (improved, but with
caveats)
Year 2005 saw a major change in the conditions of operation of companies in free
economic zones. At the end of March 2005, the parliament adopted changes to the
Budget law for 2005 that, among other things, included abolition of tax privileges for
free economic zones (FEZ) (Verkhovna Rada, 2005a). Practically all privileges for
FEZ were abolished (exemption of imports of materials and spare parts from VAT and
import duties, lower profit taxes and no taxes on investments, low or no land tax).
Although the abolition of privileges was justified (it is a part of WTO requirements and
was demanded in the action plan; see section 3.3.2 on tax reform earlier in this
report), the way it was done is subject to criticism. Firstly, it was made without prior
information given to those affected. Secondly, it was sometimes applied ex-post. For
example, the decreased ceiling for application of the VAT tax was applied to the
incomes received before the introduction of the amendments, so that many business
entities appeared to surpass the new ceiling. These amendments were strongly
opposed by the businesses affected and, eventually, some of the privileges were
returned. Overall, cancelling of privileges led to the improvement of the business
environment, but this could have been done better. 
39
PROSPECTS FOR EU-UKRAINE ECONOMIC RELATIONS
CASE Reports No. 66
Conclusions
Overall, Ukraine’s record in the area of company law and establishment is mixed:
while in some areas, such as permit system, there was a substantial progress, at least
in terms of legislative initiatives, in other areas the progress was quite limited.  
3.6. Competition policy
The EU-Ukraine action plan lists the following priorities in the field of competition
policy:
• draft and adopt state aid legislation;
• assess adequacy and compatibility of the current legislative framework with
the EU standards, particularly in respect to the principles of non-
discrimination, transparency and procedural fairness;
• continue to reinforce independence of the Anti-monopoly Committee, ensure
adequate legal powers and resources; and reinforce staff training.
Before moving to the analysis of what actions were taken since the release of the EU-
Ukraine Action Plan we will give a short background of how the competition policy in
Ukraine evolved over the last few years and what have been its successes and main
weak points.
Evolution of competition policy in Ukraine
First anti-monopoly law in Ukraine was created in 1992. The Anti-Monopoly
Committee of Ukraine (AMCU) became fully operational in 1995. Modern competition
law was adopted in 2001.
At present, the AMCU works on the basis of the 2001 Competition Law and deals
with merger controls, concerted practices, abuses of dominant position, anti-
competitive actions of state and local government authorities, and unfair
competition. After 1998 until early 2000s, the AMCU progressed in implementation
of competition policy: inspections were better focused – fewer and of shorter
durations, amounts of fines paid was increasing, as well as successes in termination
of anticompetitive practices.
Yet, there have been also weak points in the activity of the Ukrainian competition
office. Since mid-1990s independence of AMCU was reduced. The competition law
has been implemented selectively, avoiding large and ‘connected’ businesses. Still
weak judiciary has been putting too much pressure on AMCU. Moreover, AMCU has
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functioned in very regulated environment and has often fought against consequences
of high entry barriers instead of preventing them. As a consequence, competition
policy has not became an integral component of the overall economic policy. Next
four sub-sections analyse changes in the sphere of competition legislation and
competition policy that have happened in Ukraine since 2004.
State aid (worsened)
The consistent law on state aid is still missing. There exist specific regulations on state
aid in some sectors, but a general law putting all state aid under the AMCU
jurisdiction is absent.
The situation got even worse when compared to late 2004, when hopes about passing
the draft law in the Rada were high. The law On State Aid was drafted in 2003
(Verkhovna Rada, 2004a). It was much needed, for the following reasons:
• Usually an efficient competition regulation consist of: competition and consumer
protection regulations, and state aid monitoring. Ukraine has good regulations
concerning the first two areas, and AMCU has accumulated some experience in
dealing with protection of consumers and competition. It would be desirable to
move on and monitor state aid.
• Ukraine agreed that it would like to harmonise its competition legislation with
that of the EU. The need for this law was not only put as a priority in the EU-
Ukraine action plan. It was already outlined in the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, in 1998.
• The estimate of state aid granted to enterprises is as high as one fourth of
Ukrainian GDP with the major part of it in an indirect form (as tax privileges for
example), which is particularly harmful to competition (BRC, 2004).
The draft law of 2003 was supposed to put all state aid under the AMCU jurisdiction
and promote gradual reductions in its total size. It would have been the big step
forward, even though it was not considered as perfect6.
The first reading of the law took place on April 29, 2004. The law was judged as
addressing existing problems and recommended for the second reading, after some
minor corrections. The second reading took place on December 22, 2004. The
decision of the Rada was surprising. The law was not passed and taken away for
further work. The explanation was that the draft law was ‘creating a base for fraud
and corruption’ (Verkhovna Rada, 2004a-d).
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6 Some experts perceive that this draft law should have been reshaped as, among others, it did not fully address
the issue of transparency and clear and well-defined procedures (BRC, 2004).
Some months later, the text of the draft law was removed from the web site of AMCU.
The annual reports of AMCU for 2004 and 2005 stopped mentioning it.
Compatibility of antitrust law with that of the EU:
especially what regards principles of non-discrimination,
transparency and procedural fairness (no change)
The AMCU reports to work on the propositions of regulations and amendments to the
existing acts that would make the antitrust legislation more compatible with the EU
one. These works seem to intensify in 2006, and one of the effects is the draft law on
the ‘procedural competition code’ (on the basis of AMCU, 2006). However, so far
there are not any proposals registered in the Parliament which would aim to
significantly add or change current legislation (Pustovit, Marks, 2006: p. 5). The acts
and regulations that are binding now, date back to years 1993-2002 (Pustovit, Marks,
2006: p. 1, AMCU, 2006).
Reinforce the independence of the Anti-Monopoly Committee
(no change)
Nothing has been done in the sphere of reinforcing AMCU’s independence. Similarly
as in 2004, the Anti-Monopoly Committee is still too much dependent on the central
government. As a result of the changes in the 1996 law governing the role and
operations of AMCU with the adoption of Ukraine’s constitution, the chairman is no
longer chosen by the Rada, but is appointed and dismissed by the president, after the
Rada’s consent. In fact, the current chairman in office since 2001, was appointed by
the president of Ukraine. The commissioners – earlier appointed by the chairman and
approved by the parliament, are now appointed and dismissed by the president, based
on the proposals by the cabinet of ministers. These moves clearly increased in the past
the Committee dependence on executive bodies, which is not a desirable outcome as
it reduces the chances to address the issue of competition in a more effective way. No
moves reversing the situation have been taken since 2004.
Reinforce AMCU staff training (progress)
During 2003-2005 the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine has participated in the
TACIS project ‘Legal and Institutional basis for competition protection’. Project
aimed – among others – at rising skills of the personnel of the Antimonopoly
Committee, development of IT infrastructure of AMCU, and support of AMCU’s public
relation strategy in order to disseminate knowledge about protection of competition
(AMCU, 2006).
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Box. 3.4. Enforcement of competition law in Ukraine
The number of fines imposed upon the business entities and individuals or violations of
competition legislation and collected decreased both in 2004 and in 2005.
During 2004-2005 AMCU continued to reveal more violations of competition legislation,
as compared with earlier years. Total number of revealed violations was in the range of 2-
2.7 thousands cases in 2002-2003. It increased to 3.4 thousands in 2004 and then fell a
bit in 2005, to 3.2 thousand cases.
Abuse of monopoly position was the most frequently revealed in 2004-2005 and number
of revealed violations increased in recent years (see Figure 3). Then followed anticompetitive
actions of state bodies.
However, it seems that the actions towards the reduction of monopoly positions by the
AMCU have not been very effective. At least in 2004. Concentration of production within
the group of largest enterprises increased in 2004, as opposed to 2003 (Kostusev et al,
2006: pp. 11-12). This is to say that the monopolisation of production increased. On the
top of it, the Committee reverted to the bad old practice of price controls (like in early
1990s), which in fact lowered competition (see part 3.1 on market economy in this report).
Source: AMCU Annual Reports, various editions.
Figure 3. Revealed violations of competition legislation, number of cases, 1995-2003
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Source: AMCU Annual Reports, various editions, converted from hryvnas at the average yearly exchange rate.
Table 3. Amounts paid as fines and illegal benefits as a result of AMCU actions, 1998-2005
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
in EUR million 5.55 7.04 3.69 6.90 12.26 7.94 6.12 5.00
General perception of competition among entrepreneurs
Increased monopolisation of the domestic market was apparent in 2004 (see the
text box). Judging by the perception of Ukrainian business, this negative tendency
continued in 2005. Ukrainian enterprises reported that they felt smaller
competition from the side of other Ukrainian firms in 2005, as compared with
2004. About 52% of respondents (out of the sample of 3,500 firms) replied that
they face high competition from other domestic agents (56% gave the same
answer in 2004). The share of enterprises perceiving ‘domestic’ competition as
‘moderate’ increased (from 33% in 2004 to 34% in 2005). Also, the share of
respondents perceiving domestic competition as ‘weak’ or ‘nonexistent’ rose
(from 11% in 2004 to 14% in 2005) (Kostusev et al, 2006: pp. 25-26). Ukrainian
firms feel that the competition from the side of firms located abroad is much
lower than domestic one. The weaker perception of competition in 2005 is
probably a sign of increased monopolisation and still high protection of the
domestic market.
Conclusions
During the last two years, almost no significant step has been made in the field of
competition legislation. The much needed law on state aid was rejected by the
parliament in late 2004. Currently, the Antimonopoly Committee works on
regulations supporting procedures of competition enforcement. The future will show
what are the effects of these works.
In the meantime, negative tendencies have appeared on the domestic market. The
degree of concentration increased, number of revealed violations of competition
legislation rose, and less firms perceived high competition from the side of other
economic agents. On the top of it, the Committee started to use extensively price
controls, which can only lower competition.
Overall, meeting priorities related to the protection of competition of the EU-Ukraine
action plan to date are assessed as unsatisfactory. It seems that the only commitment
that was completed by the AMCU was that about the AMCU capacity building. Yet, the
perspectives of the most important goal – state aid legislation – now look worse than
in the period of drafting of the action plan.
3.7. Public procurement
List of actions of the EU-Ukraine action plan related to the government procurement
procedures includes:
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• improve the functioning of the current system;
• approximate Ukrainian legislation to EU legislation on public procurement;
• ensure the possibility of independent review in the event of disputes;
• ensure proper dissemination of information on public procurement;
• apply modern e-tendering technologies in public procurement;
• facilitate the effective, reciprocal and gradual opening of public procurement
markets.
Current state of affairs, approximation toward EU
legislation (worsened)
The overall value of public procurement in Ukraine in 2005 equalled UAH 20.75
billion (about 4.9% of GDP). Expanding capacities of state and local budgets and
increasing number of investment projects fulfilled at the expense of public resources
require effective control over the procurement practices. Given weak institutional
basis for open, fair and competitive public procurement in Ukraine, it turned out one
of most non-transparent and closed spheres of economic activities. Enormous space
for improvement of procurement quality and reduction of related costs exists.
However, this requires adequate legislative and administrative reforms.
The framework law ‘On public procurement of goods, services and works’ has been
adopted in February 2000 and since then it was amended 9 times. The law lists
institutions which are obliged to organize tenders: public central and regional
administrations, companies founded by state or regional power bodies, and
companies more than 50% of whose statutory fund is owned by the state. This
contrasts with the EU legislation on public procurement which does not cover entities
carrying out economic activities of commercial nature. The provisions of the law are
to be applied to public supplies or services provision if estimated value of the contract
exceeds UAH 30 thousand and to public works contracts if their estimated value
exceeds UAH 300 thousand. Originally the Cabinet of Ministers delegated functions of
the procurement coordination, monitoring and control to the Ministry of Economy. 
In June 2005 the law was amended and new control body – Tender Chamber of
Ukraine (TCU) was created. The TCU has the right to provide expertise as to the
lawfulness of the procurement, identify printed editions and Internet portals which
qualify for dissemination of ads on public procurement and publish a special
informational bulletin with ads on procurement. Noteworthy, the decisions of the
TCU can be contested only through the courts.
As a result of the latest amendments (December 2005) Antimonopoly Committee
became the main body responsible for smooth functioning of tender process in
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Ukraine. The functions of control over the public procurement were dispersed among
6 executive bodies7, Parliament (controlling the process through the Accounting
Chamber), and TCU. This makes the procurement monitoring and control system
really cumbersome and inefficient. The major concerns about the new version of the
law on public procurement are related to the following:
• Antimonopoly Committee is given the rights which are out of scope of authorities
of antimonopoly offices in the EU countries;
• Tender Chamber of Ukraine which is a union of NGOs is given the rights which
should be delegated to bodies of executive power, in particular, provision of
expertise in case of procurement disputes;
• The special Commission within the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine is a full-
right party of public procurement. This is a violation of basic principles of
division of functions of legislative and executive power.
Independent review in the event of disputes (no change) 
In case of disputes the parties are given the right to appeal against the procurement
results. The complaint is sent either to the contracting party or to the Commission as
well as to the TCU. Interested party has the right to appeal against the decision of
Commission or contracting authority to the court. The law does not, however, permit
to question the lawfulness of choice of the procurement procedure and application of
provisions related to preferences granted to national suppliers.
Dissemination of information on public procurement
(worsened)
Contracting authority has to publish yearly plan on procurement and information
about every procurement scheduled. According to the law the information has to be
placed in three different sources: 1) one of specialized country-wide publications on
public procurement; 2) informational bulletin of the TCU; 3) one of the public
procurement informational system in Internet. Ads on public procurement with
estimated value exceeding a certain threshold level are to be published in English.
As of August 2006 the market of public procurement information services in Internet
was monopolized by one company. In September 2006 the Antimonopoly Committee
acknowledged the monopoly power abuse of the company which set unjustified high
prices for its services and provided tied complementary services and fined the owner
of the portal for UAH 100 thousand.
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7 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Main Control and Revision Office in Ukraine, Antimonopoly Committee of
Ukraine, State Treasury, Ministry of Agricultural Policy, and authorized statistical agency.
Opening of public procurement markets (weak improvement)
Until 2000 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine’s (CMU) decree explicitly prohibited
participation of non-resident suppliers in public procurement. Currently the law
grants equal access of residents and non-residents to public tenders and information
relevant to public procurement. However, there are substantial limits for equal
competition between domestic and foreign suppliers in several respects:
• domestic producers have 10% price advantage over foreign suppliers (their price
ask is reduced by 10% when compared to proposals of foreign competitors) if the
value of contract is lower than EURO 200 thousand for goods, EURO 300
thousand for services and EURO 4 million for works;
• if, according to the contract, services or works are to be performed by a non-
resident, the contracting authority may require fulfilment of the contract with
usage of domestic materials and labour.
Ukrainian legislation does not discriminate between foreign suppliers based on
country or residence. Most Favoured Nation (MFN)  regime is granted for all non-
resident procurement participants. Since the beginning of 2005 no reciprocal
concessions as to the access of non-residents to procurement procedures in Ukraine
or the European Union have been made. Noteworthy, Ukraine committed to start
negotiations on joining the WTO multilateral Agreement on Government Procurement
upon accession to the WTO.
Public procurement trends
According to reports of TCU, Main Control and Revision Office and Accounting
Chamber public procurements in Ukraine are frequently linked with violation of laws.
No significant improvement in procurement procedures was observed in recent years.
Most of violations registered by the control bodies are related to dissemination of
incomplete information about terms of procurement, granting access to procurement
for suppliers which do not qualify for tender, violation of time constraints as to the
procurement procedure. According to Main Control and Revision Office in Ukraine in
2005 about UAH 252 million of budgetary funds were spent without a procurement
procedure which is a direct violation of law.
The competition between suppliers remains rather low. In 2005 on average 2.6 and
2.17 participants competed in open tenders and tenders with limited number of
participants respectively. This is a slight reduction compared with 2.64 and 2.24
participants respectively in 2004.
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Conclusions
The latest amendments to the law ‘On Public Procurement’ (December 2005) are
step back from the situation at the beginning of 2006. Despite essential legislative
changes implemented since the end of 2005 the institutional basis for competitive
and transparent procurements remains very weak. Complaints about violations
during public procurement procedures are still numerous both on the side of
suppliers and contractors.
Some of the provisions of the current law (i.e. those defining the circle of procurement
participants, authorized control institutions etc.) are in direct conflict with the EU
legislation. The previous version (in action before March 2006) of the law seems to be
much closer to the EU standards. Although it could serve as a solid base for further
improvements, the recent amendments led to the deterioration of the document. In
particular, the market of services for dissemination of public procurement information
was completely monopolized. Besides, the execution of checks and balances in the
sphere of government procurement substantially worsened.
Revision of the law on public procurement remains on the agenda of economic
reforms in Ukraine. In view of this the President of Ukraine ordered the Cabinet of
Minister to draft a new law on public procurement.
No substantial progress in fulfilling the provisions of the EU-Ukraine action plan with
regard to public procurement can be reported as of now.
3.8. Foreign trade
According to the EU-Ukraine action plan in the sphere of movement of goods Ukraine
should concentrate on the following issues:
• Implementation of the provisions of the PCA in the sphere of trade in goods,
liberalization of trade in steel products;
• Accession to the WTO, implementation of bilateral commitments;
• Implementation of customs legislation in line with the EU standards, improvement
of customs service functioning;
• Alignment with the EU regulatory practices; preparation to participation in the
EU internal market;
• Facilitation of movement of goods through prevention of new discriminatory
measures;
• Increase of food safety, modernization of sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
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Implementation of PCA in the sphere of trade in goods,
liberalization of trade in steel products (no change)
Strictly in line with the provisions of PCA Ukraine grants MFN regime for the EU
producers in domestic market. Imports from the EU are not discriminated based on
the country of origin. Ukraine does not impose any quantitative restrictions on
imports from the EU Member States.
Ukraine failed to liberalize trade in steel products by reducing export duties on
ferrous scrap metal. Currently an export duty of EURO 30 per ton is imposed on scrap
metal. The bilateral steel agreement between Ukraine and the EU envisages gradual
removal of trade barriers in the steel sector, including phasing out export duties on
the export of scrap metal. The Cabinet of Ministers submitted to the Parliament the
draft law suggesting two-stage reduction of duty down to EURO 12 per ton. However,
the Parliament refused to include the draft law to the agenda several times. Currently,
the Cabinet of Ministers resubmitted the document.
Accession to the WTO, implementation of bilateral
commitments (improvement)
As of June 2006 Ukraine completed bilateral negotiations with all WTO Working Party
Members apart from Kyrgyzstan. In particular, in February-March 2006 the long-
awaited bilateral agreements with the USA and Australia have been signed.
Government declared its firm intention to reach a consensus with Kyrgyzstan in the
shortest possible period.
The fulfilment of commitments under bilateral agreements has been successful. The
most significant progress was achieved in the sphere of reforming the import tariffs.
During 2005 the Parliament amended the law on Customs Tariff four times, reducing
import duties for over 70% of the commodity nomenclature. Most specific and
combined tariffs have been transformed into ad valorem tariffs. According to
government officials, most of the new tariffs are fully in line with Ukraine’s
commitments under bilateral agreements and no drastic changes of the customs tariff
will be required in the event of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO. However, there is
a number of commitments, which should be implemented more systematically. The
most important of these are the following: adoption of quota for raw cane sugar,
allowances to establish foreign bank’s subsidiaries in Ukraine, reduction of barriers
for export of scrap of ferrous and non-ferrous metals.
The work on harmonization of legislation in line with WTO norms was intensified and
resulted in an adoption of a dozen of laws and other normative acts. However, as of June
2006 the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy still identifies about 15 draft laws which need
to be adopted before Working Party takes final decision on Ukraine’s accession.
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Implementation of customs legislation in line with EU
standards, improved functioning of customs service
(some progress)
In most respects the Customs Code of Ukraine enacted since the beginning of 2004 is
fully compatible with the WTO and the EU customs regulations, including those in the
area of customs valuation. However, several concerns exist about the loose and
frequently inadequate interpretation of the norms and their practical implementation
by the customs officers. The procedures of customs valuation are not clearly defined
in by-laws. The problem can be settled by adopting the Order of Methodological
Recommendations of Certain Provisions of the Customs Code of Ukraine, which has
been drafted by the State Customs Office.
In April 2005, the government introduced a unified approach for all international
trade related documents. Importers and exporters have to submit one package of
documents to the customs office and receive the required permissions. Following the
Contraband Stop Program initiative in March 2005, the Customs service introduced
risk based customs control. According to the statistics for the first five months of 2005,
in about 15% of cases of customs operations the customs value of imported
commodities has been corrected.
Most of the reforms in the sphere of customs control were implemented in 2005.
Unfortunately, in 2006 no new initiatives have been put forward. Neither the
government nor the customs service made any single steps to strengthen the
developments of 2005. The customs service seems to lack long-run oriented strategic
planning for fulfilling the tasks specified in the EU-Ukraine action plan.
Facilitate movement of goods through prevention of new
discriminatory measures (weak improvement)
Ukrainian government failed to bring licensing procedures in line with the WTO
Agreement on Import Licensing and PCA article 20. The commodities, the import and
export of which is subject to licensing, are determined by the Cabinet of Ministries on
annual basis. Although most of commodities subject to obligatory licensing in 2006 is
in full accordance with the respective agreement, some of them (for example, beef,
pork, cows and pigs) should be excluded from the decree since their licensing cannot
be justified as means of consumer health protection. Obligatory non-automatic
licensing is deemed as a non-tariff trade barrier in this case.
Several important measures have been taken to improve access of market participants to
information relevant to external trade. Formally all interested parties are given the
opportunity to comment on the drafts of decisions of parliament and government.
However, in some cases decisions are taken without any prior discussion and without
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accounting for position of exporters, importers, or manufacturers. To facilitate access of
all interested parties to information on trade in goods, the government created national
enquiry service in March 2006 (Center for Inquiries of WTO members and WTO).
Increase food safety, modernize sanitary
and phytosanitary measures (weak improvement)
Since the beginning of 2005 Ukraine made several attempts to modernize sanitary and
phytosanitary measures. In particular, in September 2006, an amendment of the ‘Law
on Quality and Safety of Food Staff and Food Materials’ was adopted by the parliament.
In its essence it fully replaces the text of the outdated law of 2002 and is aimed at
harmonization of national food safety legislation with the requirement of the WTO SPS
agreement (WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures). Another important law on ‘Veterinary Medicine’ was adopted in December
2005. However, the President vetoed the law. His major concerns were related to the
status of the central body in the sphere of veterinary medicine. The law with the
President’s comments is being currently reviewed by the Parliament.
The Government did very modest analytical work under commitments envisaged in
the action plan such as comparative assessment of Ukrainian legislation and revision
of the list of measures for gradual convergence to the EU principles. Most of the
analytical work as to the analysis and drafting of legislature is done by TACIS and
USAID international programs of technical assistance. Similarly, there is no evidence
that the Government took any essential measures to implement Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (HACCP) system within enterprises and controlling bodies, and
whether it reviewed the national laboratory network and prepared for their
accreditation in compliance with ISO standards.
Meanwhile a first step has been made toward functioning sanitary and phytosanitary
measures enquiry point. However, the creation and functioning of information system
is still an on-going issue. In 2006 Ukraine adhered to the International Plant
Protection Convention 2006 and continued to work in Codex Alimentarius
Commission.
In general the fulfilment of Ukraine’s commitments in the sphere of sanitary and
phytosanitary control as of today remain unsatisfactory. Despite the adoption of the main
regulatory act, the remaining domains of work have not been given adequate attention.
Conclusions
The overall progress of trade regime reforms in Ukraine is not even across different
domains. In general it can be evaluated as satisfactory. Most of reform measures have
been taken during 2005 with slight deceleration of trade policy reform since the
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beginning of 2006. In particular, the negotiations on Ukraine’s WTO accession were
quite successful and Ukraine managed to demonstrate its firm intent to modernize the
trade rules in accordance with international practices. Some problems impeding the
dynamics of the reforms still remain. In particular, the government pays inadequate
attention and makes insufficient efforts to speed up harmonization of sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations and implement new HACCP system across enterprises.
Customs procedures also remain complicated and burdensome for exporters and
importers despite some current improvement. The overall progress in reforms gives,
however, premises to expect successful implementation of the action plan trade-
related provisions soon.
3.9. Movement of capital and current payments
The action plan specifies:
• full removal of restrictions on flows related to direct foreign investments and 
• initiation of consultations on liberalizations of other capital movements. 
In particular, Ukraine committed to achieve free movement of capital relating to
direct investments; guarantee the protection of foreign investments as well as
liquidation or repatriation of these investments and associated profits8.
These particular provisions of the action plan are not accompanied with underlying
concrete measures in the Action Plan Implementation Measures9. Therefore, major
regulatory changes related to capital transactions that were introduced from 2005
until mid-2006 are analysed in this report. Te capital controls classification used here
is that of the IMF10.
Removing of restrictions on long-term capital flows
(improved)
The noticeable improvement during the last year was simplification of transaction
rules on foreign investments, and repatriation of profits, dividends and income from
liquidated investment. In May 2005 the National Bank of Ukraine cancelled the
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8 EU-Ukraine Action Plan, Article 2.3.3 Movement of capital and current payments.
9 The Government of Ukraine annually adopts the Action Plan Implementation Measures. 
10 See, for example, Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 2005,
International Monetary Fund. Controls on capital transactions include controls on capital and money market
instruments; controls on derivatives and other instruments; controls on credit organizations; controls on
direct investments and their liquidation; controls on real estate transactions; controls on personal capital
transactions; provisions specific to credit institutions; provisions specific to institutional investors; other
controls imposed by security law.
resolution11 with numerous restrictive procedures on making, selling and
repatriation of foreign investments in Ukraine. According to this resolution
investments were to be made in money form only. Also, a foreign investor could not
make direct foreign currency contributions to charter capital of a Ukrainian
company. To make such contribution a foreign investor had to open a so called
investment account with an authorized Ukrainian bank, then transfer hard currency
destined for investment to that account, convert it into Ukrainian hryvnia and,
finally, transfer the money to a recipient Ukrainian company. Similar procedures of
using investment accounts (with an Ukrainian bank) had to be followed to buy/sell
corporate rights in an Ukrainian company, even when the transacting parties are
both non-residents and transaction takes place outside Ukraine. Foreign investors
wishing to repatriate dividends or to withdraw and repatriate their investment
faced the same requirement of opening and carrying out all the operations through
the investment account.
This regulation was a typical example of a poorly designed mechanism that just
inflates transaction costs for investors and domestic banks without obvious benefit of
helping the regulator to manage the volatility of the associated financial flows. We
consider a cancellation of the aforementioned resolution to be an explicit step forward
in liberalization of foreign investment flows.
Acting NBU Resolution on foreign investment transactions12 was introduced in
August 2005 and permits to directly transfer money from investor’s account in a
foreign bank to recipient firm’s account. This applies to direct and portfolio
investments. Investment accounts can be used, but they are not mandatory. Almost all
controls related to payment of dividends, repatriation of profits, repatriation of
liquidated investments are removed and those could be arranged through direct
payments abroad. At the same time rules on operations between non-residents
involving corporate rights in an Ukrainian company remained unchanged. Such
operations have to be carried out through domestic banks via the old burdensome
mechanism (described above). 
Having analyzed liberalization steps related to foreign investment flows we conclude
that Ukrainian government made reasonable progress in removing capital controls on
direct investment transactions and transactions associated with their liquidation or
repatriation. 
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11 Resolution of the National bank of Ukraine N482 ‘On Approving the Regulations on the Procedure for Making
Monetary Foreign Investments in Ukraine and Returning Investments to Foreign Investors, as well as
Repatriating Profits, Income and Other Means Derived from Investment Activity in Ukraine’ dated 14
October 2004.
12 Resolution of the National bank of Ukraine N 280 ‘On Resolving Issues Concerning Foreign Investments into
Ukraine’ dated 10 August 2005.
Another important amendment last year, although not directly related to foreign
investments, is the NBU Resolution No. 29113 on ‘Mandatory Reserves on Foreign
Currency Loans from Non-Residents’. It requires residents borrowing funds from
non-residents for less than 180 days to reserve 20% of the loan and hold it at zero-
interest NBU account. The reserve is released to the resident after the loan term
expires. Thus, the effective tax rate on capital inflows declines as loan maturity
increases. The Resolution received many negative assessments in Ukraine for the
reason that it increases borrowing costs for domestic firms and transaction costs,
in general. There are also concerns that the restriction is easy to circumvent by
signing loan contract for more than 180 days followed by earlier termination of the
contract (Dabrowski, 2006). 
Conclusions
The overview presented in this section suggests that Ukraine achieved progress in
easing capital movements related to direct investments; liquidation or repatriation of
these investments and associated profits.
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Box. 3.5 Capital flows to and from Ukraine
The table below illustrates quite pronounced growth of both FDI and portfolio flows in
2004 and, particularly, 2005. The observed could mostly be explained by post-Orange
Revolution interest to Ukraine rather than a response to any capital control
liberalization. For instance, the dramatic FDI increase in 2005 is a result of Kryvorizhstal
privatization through an open bid procedure and a number of Ukrainian bank purchases
by Western financial groups.
Source: National bank of Ukraine
Table 4. Foreign direct investments and portfolio investments into Ukrainian economy, 1999-2005,
US$ million
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
FDI 489 594 769 698 1 411 1 711 7 533
  Inflow 496 595 792 693 1 424 1 715 7 808
  Outflow -7 -1 -23 5 -13 -4 -275
Portfolio investment -86 -201 -866 -1 716 -922 2 067 2 757
13 NBU Resolution No. 291 ‘On Introducing Mandatory Reserve Funds under Currency Transactions Associated with
Residents' Attraction of Foreign Currency Credits and Loans from Non-Residents’ dated 12 August 2005,
enacted 11 September 2005.
3.10. Movement of persons including movement
of workers
The EU-Ukraine action plan does not speak clearly about reducing barriers on
international labour mobility, it concentrates only on domestic measures that should
equalise rights of foreign employees. The following commitments made by Ukraine
are listed in the action plan: 
• Ensure equal treatment of migrant workers with respect to employment and
working conditions;
• Coordinate social security systems for workers.
Equal treatment of migrant workers (no change)
The law ‘On Occupation of Population’14 adopted in 1991 allows employment of
foreigners in Ukraine subject to the permission of the State Employment Office of
Ukraine. The law, however, does not contain any provisions which guarantee equal
treatment of foreign workers with respect to employment and working conditions.
However, the decree of Cabinet of Minister of Ukraine ‘On issuance of permits for
employment in Ukraine for foreigners and persons without citizenship’ implicitly
specifies relevant norms. Article 8 of the decree states that labour permit cannot be
provided to foreign employee in case if labour contract envisages working conditions
which are worse than those for vis-à-vis Ukrainian nationals.
Official reports of Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and Employment Office of
Ukraine do not provide insights about observance of migrant workers’ rights with respect
to employment conditions. The monitoring of mass media does not reveal any evidence
of systematic unfair treatment of migrant workers in the Ukrainian labour market.
Coordination of social security systems for workers
(no change)
According to information of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection in 2005
more than 55,000 Ukrainians were legally employed abroad. Around 65% of them
worked in one of the EU Member States. At the same time about 850 EU nationals
were provided work permit for employment in Ukraine. Lack of social protection of
foreign workers still remains an unresolved problem. In most cases workers with
overseas employment experience are not granted social privileges in full measure
because of gap in social contribution record.
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According to current legislation foreign workers employed in Ukraine are obliged to
contribute to pension, disability, and emergency insurance funds. Until insured migrant
worker remains in Ukraine he/she is granted the respective social benefits on general
terms. Foreign workers (and their employers) are released from making contributions to
the unemployment insurance fund, and do not receive unemployment social benefits.
Social benefits granted for Ukrainian migrants workers in the EU Member States differ
across countries. But the general rule is that upon leaving the country Ukrainian
migrant workers cannot benefit from social contributions made during the work period
in the host countries. Temporary employment abroad leads to white spots in insurance
payment record of workers and endangers provision of smooth social payments in case
of adverse event. The problem of unaccounted work experience due to temporary
employment abroad can be solved through concluding bilateral agreements between
the states. Currently Ukraine has agreements on coordination of social security systems
with a number of EU Member States: Spain (singed in 1996), Estonia (1997), Latvia
(1998), Slovakia (2001), Check Republic (2001), and Lithuania (2002). Most of them
guarantee migrant workers the right to benefit from social contributions made
throughout the working period in countries which are the parties of agreements.
Although Ukraine committed to continue coordination of social protection policy, since
the beginning of 2005 no fruitful work in this respect was done.
Conclusions
Government and parliament should take measures to ensure legislative guarantees of
equal treatment of foreign employees by ratifying the European Charter on Status of
Migrant Workers. Besides, the government should intensify work on negotiating
bilateral agreements on coordination of social security with other states. However, the
attention should be paid not only to formal procedures (drafting, signing and ratifying
agreements) but also to the implementation of provisions of the existing agreements.
Given complexity of procedures needed for full-scale fulfilment of the documents,
Ukrainian authorities need to take more focused actions in this respect. Unfortunately,
since the beginning of 2005 no noteworthy step has been taken to advance in this
direction. No progress in fulfilling the EU-Ukraine action plan with regard to ensuring
freedom of movement of workers can be reported as of August 2006. 
3.11. Concluding remarks
On the basis of the EU-Ukraine plan of action, several commitments covering broad
range of economic issues were made. Ukraine agreed to reform its economy and
change regulations governing economic activity in order to bring these regulations
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closer to these of the EU. The first priority was given to international economic
relations, that is to the lowering of barriers to the flow of goods and capital:
• Ukraine has made good progress in the reform of its external trade regime since
2004. In the process of its negotiations for the WTO accession it modernized its
trade rules in accordance with international practices. This also included some
reform of the customs service. The slowest progress ahs been noted in
harmonization of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, implementation of the
new HACCP system and streamlining of customs procedures.
• Good progress has been made in easing capital movements, in particular those related
to direct investments, liquidation or repatriation of these investments and associated
profits. Some advance was also made with liberalization of other capital controls.
However, the issue of liberalisation of movement of workers remain a source of
concern. Although the EU-Ukraine action plan is not clear at this issue, since it is a
sensitive one for both sides, it does mention preconditions that if implemented, would
make this liberalisation easier. However, no major changes have happened in the
area. Ukraine at least in theory does not discriminate against foreign workers. At the
same time, coordination of social security system for foreign workers in Ukraine and
for Ukrainians with foreign working experience does not exist in practice.
Having relatively good record in easing restrictions on external trade and on
movements of capital, Ukraine has not progressed much with relation to the reform
of its domestic market. Privatisation of the state-owned enterprises almost stopped,
some elements of price controls have been introduced, the long-awaited law on state
aid was abandoned. Fiscal sustainability worsened, and there is not much hope at the
moment that the central bank will soon gain more independence that is needed if the
monetary policy goal is to be changed. Some steps in the good direction have been
also taken. Among them were improved transparency of the privatisation process and
of operations at the domestic securities market, as well as large-scale entries of
European banks and financial groups that brings hopes for the break up in the
previous interlocking oligarch-government relationships and for the development of
the banking sector. However, the overall balance on reforming the internal Ukrainian
market is to date (autumn 2006) unsatisfactory. In particular:
• Ukraine’s record on strengthening the foundations for market economy has been
positive but weak. Abolishment of many unnecessary regulatory acts and more
active dialogue with business were the major achievements. Yet, overall, the market
economy foundations did not undergo any breakthrough, and in some cases, like
with introduction of price controls or with recent re-emergence of strong links
between large business and policy makers, were substantially undermined.
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• Central bank independence was not strengthened, and, instead, some facts point
at its possible weakening. According to an index of central bank independence,
NBU is half way to the complete independence.
• The fiscal sustainability worsened, mainly due to pension increases that, not
matched by the revenues, led to the accumulation of the large Pension Fund
deficit. Given Ukraine’s demography, it puts additional pressure on already high
obligations of future generations. However, in the field of taxation, several
requirements of the action plan were partially of fully met, in particular those
related to reduction or elimination of tax privileges.
• The progress with structural reforms was weak. The government improved the
transparency of privatization process, yet the process itself stopped – no major
enterprises were privatised from 2005 until the autumn of 2006. It is too soon to
examine the functioning of the new banking sector regulations. There have been
no major change on the front of improvement of corporate governance and
protection of the minority shareholders’ rights. Not only the long-awaited law
banning the existence of ‘closed-stock companies’ have not been adopted. Even if
adopted, it would have to be accompanied by other changes in order to be
maximally efficient. This would include: the adoption of international accounting
standards, well-performing depository system, the development of derivatives
market, clear policy as to financial markets development, tax reforms, elimination
of discrepancies between the Civil and the Commercial codes, etc.
• In the area of company law and establishment, positive changes were observed
in the permit system, yet, on other issues, such as land ownership by foreign
companies and stable conditions for investment nothing improved. 
• The progress in the area of competition policy was unsatisfactory: almost no
significant nor binding step has been made in the field of competition legislation;
The much needed law on state aid was not adopted; and there were some
indications of increased uncompetitive practices. 
• The amendments made to the law On Public Procurement deteriorated the
situation in public procurement by weakening the system of checks and
balances. Moreover, the market of services for dissemination of public
procurement information was completely monopolized.
To summarise, Ukraine’s progress with the implementation of the action plan has been
very heterogeneous. In several areas, such as trade and financial liberalisation, Ukraine
did good job. In others, related mostly to the difficult structural reforms, not much
success was noticed. In some extreme cases, policies even led to the deterioration of
economic conditions. The situation now calls for concentrating efforts on domestic
reforms, alongside finalising WTO entry and trade negotiations with the EU.
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4.1. Ukraine’s WTO accession
4.1.1. Past and current trade liberalisation with the EU
Although Ukraine applied for GATT membership in 1993, the process was frozen until
2000. Recent success in completing bilateral and multilateral negotiations makes
Ukraine’s WTO membership a feasible short run perspective. Joining WTO may
substantially broaden the scope of trade relations between Ukraine and EU.
Technically Ukraine’s WTO membership is a necessary precondition for further
mutual liberalization of trade in goods in services with the EU. WTO accession is also
likely to become a milestone event speeding up integration of Ukraine into the global
economy. Such step will mark a pronounced progress in Ukraine’s economic reforms,
and at the same time it will signal about Ukraine’s readiness to implement more
elaborate and enhanced reforms of trade policy. 
Being out of WTO system, Ukrainian economy suffers from integration processes in
the European continent in some respects. For example, forthcoming EU accession of
Bulgaria and Romania will hamper trade between Ukraine and these two countries.
The overall volume of steel supplied from Ukraine to their markets totalled about 0.6
million tons in 2005. Since 2007 the supply of steel to the new member states will be
regulated by the general quota determined by the EU (about 1.1 million tons per year).
However this quota regime will have to be eliminated by the EU when Ukraine
accedes to the WTO. This is one of the examples that explain why WTO accession is
an urgent issue on the agenda of current economic policy in Ukraine.
Currently the EU and Ukraine grant each other the MFN regime on the basis of the
provisions of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). However, PCA
expires in 2008 and formally all the preferences envisaged by the document should be
renegotiated. WTO accession grants Ukraine time unlimited MFN regime in the EU
market. Most of trade-related provisions of the PCA will no longer be a part of
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bilateral agreements. Instead, multilateral WTO regulations will have predominant
role in designing the trade relations between Ukraine and the EU. This gives a
substantial long-term advantage for economies, i.e. stability, transparency and
predictability of trade regime. Trade restrictions will not be imposed unilaterally
without sound legal justification based on provisions of universal trade agreements.
4.1.2. Ukraine’s WTO offer
Ukraine’s commitments and concessions fixed in bilateral protocols cover effectively
the whole nomenclature of commodities and service sectors. According to the
Ministry of Economy, import tariffs for industrial products will be tied at the average
level of about 5% by the end of transition period. The average tariff level for
agricultural products will be more than twice higher. Ukraine will maintain export
duties on commodities that are subject to export charges today: scrap of ferrous
metals and alloyed steel, sunflower seeds, live animals, and skins of cattle. Ukraine,
however, will abstain from imposing export duties towards other commodities.
Substantial concessions will be made in service sector. Ukraine committed to fully
liberalize cross border supply of services as well as provision of services through
consumption abroad. Besides, the supply of services through mode 3 (commercial
presence) will be completely liberalized in 139 out of 155 sectors. Among others
Ukraine will open the banking market by allowing branches of foreign banks to
operate in the country and insurance market by allowing non-resident re-insurers
dealing with certain kinds of risks. These concessions had remained subject of hot
debates until the end of bilateral negotiations. The limitations on commercial
presence will be preserved in education, medical and dental services, postal services,
law and auditing services etc. Ukraine also commits to allow access of senior
employees within the forth mode of service supply (presence of natural persons). 
4.1.3. Estimated effects of Ukraine’s WTO entry and
liberalisation progress
Despite comprehensive commitments and concessions of Ukraine, WTO
membership will not substantially alter the level of external protection. Current
trade regime of Ukraine is deemed as rather liberal. In many respects Ukraine
grants trading partners more liberal access to its internal market than many of the
WTO members. Until now the country has implemented majority of reforms in
order to fulfil commitments fixed in bilateral protocols and to comply with the WTO
agreements. In particular, since 2004 the parliament passed a dozen of laws
60
Małgorzata Jakubiak, Anna Kolesnichenko (eds.)
CASE Reports No. 66
harmonizing trade-related legislature with the WTO agreements. Adopted laws and
regulatory acts refer to technical standards, antidumping and countervailing
practices, customs valuation, intellectual property rights etc. During 2005 the
parliament amended the law ‘On Customs Tariffs’ three times lowering rates for
over 70% of the nomenclature of the Harmonized System. Some of the active tariffs
are lower than maximum values under the schedule. Ukraine also abolished all
restrictions as to the share of foreign capital in statutory funds of companies. Two
remaining restrictions apply to news agencies (share of foreign capital in their
statutory funds cannot exceed 35%), and companies distributing printed editions
(the limit for foreign capital is 30%). The former restriction will be preserved;
however, the latter should be abolished upon accession to WTO.
Access of Ukrainian producers to the EU market has been also liberalized and current
tariffs are not a binding obstacle to exports from Ukraine to EU. According to the
World Bank estimates, Ukraine benefits substantially from the preferences granted by
the EU under the Generalized System of Preferences (World Bank, 2004). About one
third of exports to the EU are tariff-free under the Generalised System of Tariff
Preferences (GPS), one third is subject to preferential tariffs under the GSP, and only
one third is subject to MFN rates. Thus, Ukraine’s WTO accession will not affect in
any important way the level of EU tariff barriers for Ukrainian commodities.
Much of the progress in liberalizing commodity markets was achieved thanks to
bilateral agreements between Ukraine and the EU. The textile agreement signed
between the parties in 2000 required that Ukraine lower the import tariffs on textile
and clothing products. In its turn, the EU lifted quotas on Ukrainian apparel. Bilateral
agreement provided a good base for successful and systemic dismantling of trade
barriers in this sector. Gradual liberalization of textile trade created preconditions for
smooth adaptation of the economy towards functioning under terms agreed during
the WTO accession negotiations.
Some of the trade barriers, however, still remain an impediment to trade flows and
Ukraine’s accession to WTO may substantially improve the situation. WTO accession
may increase in trade volumes between Ukraine and EU in a number of ways:
• Both parties will enjoy MFN regime in each other’s markets on a permanent
basis. The MFN regime will cover the whole nomenclature of commodities and
services traded between Ukraine and EU. At the same time EU will be able to
preserve the preference granted for Ukraine under GSP;
• The EU and Ukraine will abolish all kinds of quantitative restrictions since they
contradict the GATT. Quotas may be further imposed only as safeguard
measures or in case of critical balance of payments situation;
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• Customs procedures will become easier. Ukraine will have to fully comply with
the WTO agreements on customs valuation, rules of origin, import licensing that
are designed to simplify export and import procedures;
• Many kinds of non-tariff barriers (unjustified technical requirements, sanitary
and phytosanitary measures, cumbersome certification etc.) will be removed;
• National treatment will be granted for commodities and services originating in
the territories of the parties;
• Harmonization of Ukrainian technical standards and international regulations
will be intensified.
Assessment of potential benefits of Ukraine’s WTO membership gives quite optimistic
results. A comprehensive research based on a single country static computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model evaluates potential increase in social welfare at the
level of 3.0% while additional GDP growth is expected at the level of 1.9%. Three most
important factors were taken into account by researchers: reduction in import tariffs,
improved access of Ukrainian producers to external markets, and changes in taxation
(elimination of prohibited and actionable subsidies to producers) (Pavel et al., 2004).
However, thanks to the progress in trade regime reforms on the eve of WTO
accession, most of the modelled changes have already been implemented. Thus
quantifiable affects of joining the WTO in comparison to the current situation (2006)
will be quite moderate. This, however, does not preclude the fact that the benefits of
the WTO membership steaming from better competitive environment and improved
institutions remain substantial.
4.2. Further liberalisation of trade:
FTA between Ukraine and the European Union
Upon accession to the WTO Ukraine the most-favoured nation principle (MFN) will apply
as the general rule. Thus if a certain preference is to be granted by Ukraine (the EU) for
the EU (Ukraine) the similar preferences must be granted for other WTO members to
ensure compliance with the MFN rule. Within the WTO a country may grant preferential
trade regime for trading partners through two schemes: 1) under the Generalized System
of Preferences and 2) under free trade and customs union agreements.
Textbook free trade
Classical free-trade area (FTA) envisages phasing out import and export tariff over the
commodities traded between the parties of the FTA and full liberalization of trade in
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services. Other two pillars of free trade zones (free movement of capital and labour)
are usually seen as elements of deeper integrated economic systems. For instance, in
case of 2004 EU enlargement free movement of labour between old and new member
states will be unconditionally implemented only after the 7-year transition period.
FTA functioning
Free trade agreements may potentially complicate the customs procedures of the
countries since customs officers have to be able to determine the country of origin of
commodities. Technically this is more difficult than just using a single tariff over a
certain commodity irrespective of the country of its origin. However, currently
Ukraine and the EU use a number of different import tariff sets: rates for MFN, full
rates, rates under the GSP (EU case). Since simple free trade zone requires nothing
but phasing our customs tariff on commodities, FTA remains institutionally feasible
option even in the short period of time. Implementation of the FTA will require limited
organizational, financial and informational resources.
If the EU and Ukraine do not form a customs union, then trade liberalization will still
require application of rules of origin. The EU requirements on the rules of origin are
quite strict, so proving the origin may become a substantial non-tariff barrier. They
involve the requirement to satisfy a number of administrative procedures, to provide
certain documentation and to maintain advanced accounting systems. Rules of origin
also encourage companies in partner countries to use inputs from the EU (in which
case there is no need to prove the origin). Yet, such practices may mean trade
diversion and sub-optimal use of resources (as inputs from the EU may be more
expensive than those from third countries). Analysis of the experience of the Balkan
countries suggests that the rules of origin have been a significant barrier in those
countries trade with the EU (Brenton and Manchin, 2002).
One way for Ukraine to reduce the burden of proving the origin would be to engage in
outward processing agreements (buying EU inputs for production and then export final
products to the EU), as many Eastern and Southern European countries did, yet this
may be an inefficient solution, as discussed above. The major responsibility for
reducing the restrictiveness of the rules of origin lies within the EU. The reform should
be directed at lessening the number and detail of technical requirements and replacing
them by simpler ones, preferably based on change of tariff heading method.
Concerns regarding Ukraine’s trade with third parties
Technically any country can be a participant of unlimited number of free trade zones.
Thus, Ukraine-EU FTA does not require abolition of preferential trade agreements
with other trading partners of Ukraine. Ukraine will have the right to preserve free
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trade with Russia and other CIS countries without any limitations. Russian officials,
however, expressed concerns regarding possible FTA between Ukraine and EU. The
argument is that rules of origin will be more difficult to observe and EU-manufactured
products will penetrate Russian market through Ukraine. Given weak institutions and
widespread corruption, Ukrainian exporters have a number of possibilities to obtain
false documents certifying Ukrainian origin of EU-manufactured products15.
Similarly, the EU may express its concerns about inadequate control over rules of
origin in Ukraine. Thus creation of FTA requires adequate institutional reforms to
avoid fraud with documents. Otherwise, further steps to liberalize trade regime with
the EU may endanger smooth functioning of free trade zone with Russia, and lead to
frequent accusation of trade deflection.
Membership in customs unions, on the other hand, requires leaving other free
trade agreements with third countries, unless the custom union itself has free trade
with those third countries. For instance, the three Baltic countries had to abolish
free trade agreements with Ukraine upon their accession to the EU. Thus if
Ukraine decided to aim at free trade with the EU it would have to align its trade
policies towards Russia on those of the EU, and similarly  in the case of a customs
union with Russia. 
Formation of free trade areas and customs unions is compatible with the WTO
regulations. In particular, while designing the FTA or customs union agreement all
parties have to comply with the Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 (General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994). Several conditions must be met to ensure that integration
procedures correspond to the WTO rules. The main principle is that  substantially all
the trade in goods between the free trade partners has to be liberalised to the point of
zero tariffs. WTO rules however make a clear distinction between the free trade in
goods and free trade in services. One form of trade liberalization can be pursued
without any progress regarding other forms.
Implementation of the EU-Ukraine FTA
An important consequence of such regulations is that step by step opening of
separate markets (i.e. textile, machinery etc.) by phasing out trade tariffs and
preserving tariff barriers in other sectors cannot go under a FTA. The only
possibility is temporal, during transition periods, when tariffs are gradually
lowered by both sides. But in the end, the EU and Ukraine will have to abolish
tariffs on vast majority of products originating in Ukraine and in the EU.
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15 The latest Russia’s ban on import of dairy and meat products originating in Ukraine was partially motivated
by weak control of Ukrainian authorities and producers over the origin of meat. Imported into Ukraine meat
was re-exported to Russia as domestic products under false documents.
Protection of sensitive sectors can be ensured through eliminating certain products
from free trade regime. The number (volume) of such eliminations should be
reasonable so that substantial sectoral coverage be preserved. Most probably both
Ukraine and EU will insist on preserving tariffs on several groups of commodities.
The list of eliminations will include the agricultural and food products that are less
prepared for competition within the free trade area.
Classical FTA between Ukraine and EU will be of limited scope, since both parties
reserve the right to use WTO legal instruments to protect their markets in case of
critical problems. In fact simple free trade leaves some space for manoeuvre and
temporary departure from the granted preferences. First, both parties will preserve
the rights to import restrictions on imports of certain commodities as element of
safeguard measures. This is viewed as possibility to protect sensitive markets in the
future. Second, both parties will be able to protect domestic markets through
antidumping and countervailing duties. Lack of harmonization of respective
legislation and practices gives chances to impose constraints on free movement of
certain types of commodities. Under simple free trade agreement Ukrainian and
European producers will remain under the risk of protectionist measures.
Conclusions
WTO accession remains an urgent issue on the agenda of current economic policy in
Ukraine. Trading with the EU by the multilateral rules is viewed as a substantial long-
term advantage for Ukraine, but a minor one for the EU. Given substantial progress
in trade regime reforms, Ukraine is already enjoying much of the preferences granted
by the EU for its trading partners. However, some of impediments for trade between
EU and Ukraine still remain substantial. WTO accession will accelerate the reforms
and broaden the scope of cooperation of Ukraine and EU in many respects. After
joining the WTO Ukraine has an option to initiate free trade negotiations with the EU
with a view of completing the process within several years. FTA should be acceptable
for both parties (unlike customs union), although some restrictions and eliminations
in free trade regime will be preserved. Within the FTA the trade in commodities will
be liberalized first. Dismantling barriers for trade in services is a more challenging
task for longer term perspective.
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4.3. Beyond typical EU free trade
in manufacturing: ‘FTA+’
4.3.1. Typical EU FTAs and gains from increased
manufacturing trade
The free-trade agreement of the type that the EU usually signs with its neighbours
falls short of creating truly free trade. The coverage of such agreement is limited
to manufacturing goods only, with high protection in agricultural trade still being
in place. This was the case with FTAs that have been signed and implemented with
the current eight EU new member states, with the current accession states
(Romania and Bulgaria), and it was also the case of FTAs signed more recently by
the EU with Morocco and Egypt, as well as the one signed between the EU and
Croatia and between the EU and Macedonia. Moreover, the typical FTA can take
as long as 10 years to be fully implemented. However the EU is usually willing to
front-load the elimination of its tariffs. However, an important positive side of
FTAs signed by the EU, is that they typically include a number of provisions (e.g.
related to capital flows, standards, political dialogue, etc.) that could lower non-
tariff barriers to trade. Provided that the whole liberalisation program is
attractive and strict but realistic timetable is set, such wider in scope FTAs could
bring substantial gains, which would stem mainly from domestic reforms in the
EU neighbourhood.
It is clear that at the moment the ‘usual’ EU FTA in manufacturing is the most realistic
step in that would happen in the medium-run. And for this reason, consequences of
this type of agreement are analysed here.
For the reasons related to its coverage, the EU-Ukraine free trade in manufacturing
goods is unlikely to result in high welfare gains. Existing studies suggest that the gains
for the EU will be rather negligible (see Table 5) due to asymmetric economic
relations. Ukraine accounts for a tiny fraction of the EU trade (in 2005 it accounted
for 0.7% of the EU imports and 1.2% of all EU exports of goods).
For Ukraine, the results will be more pronounced, although not immediately felt
across the whole economy. The welfare results are estimated to be in range of 1%-2%
of GDP (see Table 5). The higher gain is to be observed only in case of deeper
integration between the EU and Ukraine, the one that goes beyond free trade in
manufacturing (for this, see the next section on ‘FTA+’).
The welfare gains are to originate from the elimination of subsidies and opening of
local markets, tariff reductions, better access to the other WTO members’ markets (as
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a result of the entry into the WTO, which is a precondition of the EU-Ukraine FTA).
The higher gains are possible only after integrating deeper (‘FTA+’; see the following
section) and originate from the significant elimination of the non-tariff barriers to
trade (as a result from harmonisation of Ukrainian regulations and mutual
recognition of norms and standards; see results of CEPS, 2006 in Table 5).
However, even free-trade in manufacturing would help in changing the structure of
Ukraine’s economy in the medium-term, similarly as it was the case of Poland and
other current new member states some years ago (see text box 4.1). Manufacturing
trade can support long-term development of the country, making it at the same time
more hospitable for foreign investment.
In turn, enlarged investment flows are beneficial for both sides. They can increase
prospects for higher returns for the EU investors, as Ukraine is the country growing
at rates higher than the majority of the mature EU economies, has large domestic
market, and is expected to withstand the higher pace of development still for some
time, provided that the proper domestic policies are there. When looking from the
Ukrainian perspective, it seems that at the moment Ukraine needs more long-term
foreign capital that would help to boost further domestic production and help in
67
PROSPECTS FOR EU-UKRAINE ECONOMIC RELATIONS
CASE Reports No. 66
* – slightly different approach; partial equilibrium analysis
Notes: table contains references to static welfare gains
Source: Jakubiak, Paczynski (eds. 2006), Pavel et al (2004), Vinhas de Souza (2004).
Table 5. Welfare gains from liberalisation of EU-Ukraine trade – selection of empirical results
Study
Gains for the EU
(% change of national
income)
Gains for Ukraine
(or Former Soviet Union)
(% change of national income)
Notes
WTO accession
Ukraine*
(Eremenko
and Lisenkova,
2004)
n/a
Welfare gain of 1.1% of GDP
from bringing the steel
production to WTO rules
– elimination of subsidies
and opening for
external markets
Ukraine
(Pavel et al.
2004)
n/a Welfare gain of 1.9%
of GDP (consumption up 3%)
Full WTO membership: tariff
reductions (including
agricultural goods), better
market access for Ukrainian
products, removal of distorting
domestic subsidies
EU-Ukraine Free Trade Agreements
Ukraine
(CEPS, 2006)
Negligible Negligible Typical EU FTA
Ukraine
(CEPS, 2006)
Negligible
4-7% welfare gain through
lowering of non-tariff
barriers to trade
‘Deep’ EU-Ukraine FTA
Former Soviet
Union (Vinhas
de Souza, 2004)
Welfare improving
and negligible
increase in production
Welfare improving and 0.2%
increase in production
restructuring. Foreign direct investors can transfer experience and technology and
foster competition, constantly improving productivity of Ukrainian manufacturing
sector, similarly as has been the case in all current new EU members. In the case of
Ukraine, their role is also important for the development of domestic financial
markets. Also, FDI can help in developing competitive labour market and generate
positive spillovers for local environment. It is expected that lower barriers in
manufacturing trade between the EU and Ukraine can support further inflows of this
type of capital into Ukraine.
4.3.2. ‘FTA+’
Looking beyond a standard FTA it would be in the interest of both the EU and Ukraine
to extend coverage of an agreement, to something that could be called an FTA+, such
as the one described in the recent feasibility study on the EU-Ukraine FTA (CEPS,
2006, pp. 126-127). Depending on other circumstances it may be advisable to promote
such more ambitious agenda either at an early stage of FTA negotiations or only later.
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Box 4.1. Liberalisation of manufacturing trade with the EU changed structure of Polish exports
The EU-Polish trade in manufacturing started to be liberalised in 1994, when the EU lifted
tariffs on industrial goods imported from Poland with the exception of textiles and steel. The
free trade area in manufacturing was completed in 2002. The liberalisation was asymmetric,
with the EU lowering its tariffs faster.
The gradual removal of tariffs resulted in changes of commodity structure of Polish exports. In
1995 when on the basis of the European Agreement Polish manufacturing commodities with
exception of steel and textile products could enter the EU market duty-free for the second year,
Polish firms still exported to the EU predominantly products of the steel and textile industries.
At that time, low labour costs and relatively small capital investment that is required in
production of textiles and metal products were primarily drives of export to the EU. The share
of both these groups in Polish exports to the EU was as high as 1/3 of the total. Value of
exports to the EU of these two industries increased over years; in case of export of metal
products it almost doubled until 2003. Though, structural changes took place in the meantime
and other industries started expansion of their products to the EU markets at much faster rates.
As a result, tariff-free access boosted export-oriented production of machinery and transport
equipment that currently make up over 40% of total Polish exports to the EU. In value terms,
exports of machinery grew nearly seven-fold in 1995-2003.
From mid-1995 geographical structure of Polish trade remains broadly unchanged, with
around 70% of exports going to the EU and over 60% of imports originating there.
The authors of this report chose the restricted number of the elements from the
original ‘FTA+’ proposal by CEPS (2006). The choice was motivated by the
effectiveness of the proposed package, and by the feasibility of particular actions.
However, even such restricted list may result in income gains that are couple of times
higher than those stemming from the pure FTA in manufacturing. The FTA+ package
should include, among other, the following actions:
• Support to customs service reform (an ambitious agenda was set in the EU-
Ukraine action plan; however the functioning of the customs service remains
huge barrier to trade);
• Harmonisation and mutual recognition of standards reducing non-tariff barriers
to trade;
• The adoption of agri-food standards (with the complete integration in the sphere
of agriculture impossible, this can lower barriers to trade, develop agricultural
internal market and reduce scope for phyto-sanitary concerns);
• Removing restrictions to capital mobility and opening Ukraine’s financial services
market16;
• Support for better implementation of competition policy – convergence with EU
practices; (relatively good competition law is in practice not implemented or
used very selectively17);
• Support for implementation of good corporate governance in Ukraine (that is a
problem issue at present18).
There is also a scope for further integration in the network industries, such as energy
and transport (see section 4.4.3 on services later in this report). 
In the most optimistic scenario, one can think of the integration between the EU
and Ukraine of the type that we would call an ‘EEA light’. It could become an option
worth considering for the EU, albeit in a more distant future. The name ‘EEA light’
refers to the type of integration that would be similar to the European Economic
Area19 (Formed by the EU, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein), yet with less
regulatory harmonisation. The degree of regulatory harmonisation could be decided
on a case by case basis in view of the characteristics of each sector. For instance,
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16 See more on this in part 4.5: Challenges for deep integration: free capital mobility.
17 See section 3.10 on competition policy.
18 See sections on structural reforms in chapter 3 of this report.
19 The EEA was formed by the EU, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein and assures four freedoms of movements
of: manufacturing goods (agricultural trade is excluded), services, capital and persons. Norway, Iceland and
Lichtenstein have rights to participate during the formulation of European Community legislation, but not
the right to a voice in decision-making, which is reserved exclusively for Member States. Because the
countries are very closely linked to the EU, some of their national legislation is taken over by the EC rules
(connected with trade and movement of people and companies, also about company law) and their laws,
especially those regarding economic activity are harmonised with these of the EU.
full regulatory harmonisation could be targeted for air transport. While for example
the regulation of financial services in Ukraine can be governed by prudent domestic
rules that are not necessarily need to be as sophisticated as the current EU
directives. Such an option would be very challenging, in particular for the EU, and
would require mutual recognition of own institutions and standards. However, for
the whole set of reasons, such an option still looks to be possible only in the longer-
term, and is conditional on many issues.
4.4. Granting Ukraine access to the EU
Internal Market
4.4.1. What the action plan says
A prospect of improved market access is the major offer of the European
neighbourhood policy in general and EU-Ukraine agreements in particular. While
launching the ENP in 2003, the EU made quite an ambitious yet vague proposal
about a prospect of the neighbours’ ‘stake in the EU’s Internal Market’ and
promotion of ‘four freedoms’ – free movement of persons, goods, services and
capital (EC, 2003, p. 4). The EU-Ukraine action plan also envisages ‘a perspective
of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration, including
through a stake in the EU’s Internal Market, and the possibility for Ukraine to
participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes’20. The plan
does not specify what ‘a stake in the internal market’ could mean in practice, yet
Article 30 implies that Ukraine can get access to the common market in selected
sectors given that it adopts EU standards and practices in these sectors. The plan
also envisages liberalization in services sector, in particular, in financial services,
again, conditioned on conduct of a range of reforms (Article 34). 
The idea of non-EU countries participation in the EU internal market is not new, and
so far it was extended to the European Economic Area (EEA) countries – Norway,
Iceland and Lichtenstein. Switzerland also has agreements with the EU on market
access, but only in specific sectors. The experience of integration of Central and
Eastern European (CEE) countries could also be of interest, although not directly
transmittable to Ukraine unless it enters on the EU accession track. 
It is not clear yet what market access for ENP countries in general and for Ukraine in
particular will involve. At maximum it could mean the same degree of integration as
there exist among the EU members or EEA countries. We will briefly discuss what
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20 EU-Ukraine Action Plan, 2005, Kyiv, p. 1.
such integration may mean, i.e. what participation in the EU common market
involves, and then will turn to discussion of what could be realistically achieved in
case of Ukraine.
In the rest of this chapter we analyze in more detail the opportunities for Ukraine’s
goods and services markets integration with those of the EU; free movement of capital
and people are discussed separately in subsequent chapters.
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Box 4.2. Single European Market
In simple terms, the Single European Market is free movement of people, goods, services and
capital. The greatest degree of integration within the EU has been achieved in the goods
market, so that all goods can be traded without restrictions within the EU. The integration in
the sector started with abolishment of tariffs and quotas, which was done by late 1960s. Yet,
the truly common market became possible only with elimination of non-tariff barriers. Over
1986-1992, a major overhaul of legislation and procedures was conducted to this end. In
some areas Member States legislation was replaced by common EU laws, in other areas a
mutual recognition principle was applied. The first method (harmonization) was applied to
the products that present some risks in their usage such as pharmaceuticals or construction
products; therefore, to minimize these risks and to introduce certainty in their trade the EU
introduced common technical regulations. With regard to low-risk products, a mutual
recognition principle was adopted, under which Member States give each others' laws and
technical standards the same validity as their own, so that the goods can move freely
throughout the EU. Exceptions to this principle are possible in cases when its application
poses a risk to public safety, health or the protection of the environment. Currently, about a
half of the trade in goods within the EU is harmonised and the other half is a 'non-
harmonised' sector (governed by mutual recognition principle or not regulated at all). 
Harmonized sectors are vehicles, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, construction products,
cosmetics, electrical equipment, footwear, gas appliances, electrical equipment,  mechanical
equipment, medical devices, radio and telecommunications terminal equipment, textiles, toys
and several others. The regulations normally have the form of directives issued by the
European Commission (EC) that are obligatory for implementation by Member States. Full
access to the EU market would require a partner to adopt all of them.
Implementation of the mutual recognition principle has proven to be a challenge, as there
are big discrepancies among standards applied in different Member States and also
differences in interpretation of standards by governments and economic agents. The only
way to eliminate these uncertainties seems to be to move to greater harmonization in certain
areas and to elaborate unified procedures for assessing conformity (EC, 2001a). It is not
difficult to envisage that extension of the mutual recognition principle to neighbour states
4.4.2. Better market access in goods – removing NTBs
Opportunities offered by markets integration
Accession to the EU internal market in goods means reduction of all tariff and non-
tariff barriers to the level enjoyed within the EU. Ukraine’s accession to the WTO will
result in removal of all quantitative restrictions and substantial reduction of tariffs on
industrial products. Further reduction of tariffs between the EU and Ukraine can be
agreed in the free trade agreement. Reduction or removal of tariffs for agricultural
products may become an important part of such an agreement, as in the frames of the
WTO this sector is liberalized only partially. Yet, as the experience of the EU suggests,
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will face big difficulties, as the discrepancies in standards and procedures will likely be much
larger than between member states.
Creation of the EU single market in services started much later than that in goods. The
internal market for services means that EU companies are free to establish themselves in any
Member State and are free to provide services on the territory of EU Member State other
than the one in which they are established. The main venues through which services has
been liberalized up until recently was the case law of the European Court of Justice and
common legislation in several areas (financial services, telecommunications, broadcasting
and the recognition of professional qualifications). It was only in 2004 that the Commission
started to develop a general directive on services harmonization that would allow creating
a comprehensive single market for services. 
Capital movement in the EU was mostly liberalized in early 1990s, in particular, with adoption
of the Maastricht Treaty. Movement of capital in the EU is governed by EC Treaty provisions
and by the case law of the European Court of Justice and Court of First Instance (ECJ); in
addition the Commission sometimes issues interpretative Communications. According to the
EC Treaty, all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States are prohibited.
These include all operations needed for capital movements conducted as by legal so by
physical persons, including direct investments, investments in real estate, operations with
securities, deposits and loans in financial institutions, personal capital movements etc. 
The fourth freedom – free movement of people – can be broken down into several
freedoms: freedom of movement of persons, of workers and of self-employed persons. The
first of them – freedom of movement of persons – comes with the EU citizenship and allows
the people possessing it to move and reside freely in any Member State regardless of the
economic activity. The other two freedoms are linked to the exercise of an economic activity
and allow people to work and live in a member state other than their own based on the fact
of their exercising that activity.
for a genuine free movement of goods elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTB)
becomes crucial. The majority of such barriers are technical barriers to trade (TBT)
and emerge due to differences in countries’ standards and regulations. Among other
barriers are border crossing costs and uncertainties about the partner country market
due to differences in administrative procedures and business practices. To overcome
these barriers, the EU introduced harmonization and mutual recognition of standards
and regulations. WTO has similar framework for its members. Adoption of WTO rules
and standards will help Ukraine approaching EU standards, but additional
harmonization with EU will still be needed. 
The reduction of NTBs is likely to have overall positive welfare effect both on Ukraine
and the EU. Unlike tariffs, which bring income for the government, NTBs are a pure
loss, so their reduction should increase the total welfare. Yet, there are also some costs
involved, i.e. costs of compliance with new standards and procedures, especially
when they are stricter than domestic ones. Companies may need to replace or
upgrade their equipment, change labelling, conduct additional tests etc. This may
appear to be especially difficult for small companies, as costs of compliance may take
a large share of their revenues. At the same time, harmonization may reduce the costs
of compliance, in particular, by making compliance services more available and
understandable. Establishment of EU accredited certification centres in Ukraine
would make certification more understandable and available to Ukrainian companies. 
The results of surveys and studies conducted in other countries suggest that the
overall effect of harmonization is positive. For example, the latest survey among
EU15 countries conducted on the request of the European Commission shows that
many components of the Single Market had a positive effect on business:
elimination of customs documentation was reported to be the most beneficial (48%
of respondents said that had a positive effect on their business), together with
abolition of border controls (42%), harmonization of VAT procedures for sales
within the EU (34%) and of European product standards (33%) (EC, 2002). The
study also finds that large companies (that employ more than 250 people) have
benefited more than smaller companies, and companies that are heavily involved
in the intra-EU trade have benefited more from Single Market measures than those
trading on a smaller scale. 
A range of studies have also been conducted on the estimation of possible effects of
Eastern European countries access to the EU markets. One of the early studies is by
Baldwin et al (1997), where the authors use a computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model to analyze the implications of the elimination of all trade barriers between
CEE countries and the EU, adoption of the common external tariff and accession to
the Single Market. According to their estimates, CEE countries are going to gain
between 1.5 and 18.8% depending on assumptions about the investment risk
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reduction (in a more optimistic scenario integration into the EU market leads to
reduction of the risk premium in the CEE). Another estimation – by Lejour et al
(2001) – uses a gravity model to calculate the effects of integration and gives about
5-9% of GDP of welfare gain for different CEE countries. Maliszewska (2004)
obtained similar results, yet with the use of a different technique (direct modelling of
components of common market in a CGE framework). The findings of different
studies are summarized in Table 6.
Costs and limitations of integration for Ukraine
Market integration can also involve costs. These mostly relate to the need to introduce
a range of administrative procedures and to adopt common standards. There can also
be some negative trade effects, such as trade diversion. Given that Ukraine is not
currently on the EU membership track, it can chose the extent and the scope of its
integration with the EU, in which case careful weighting of costs and benefits of
integration becomes crucial.
Border procedures
Substantial reduction or elimination of border costs will be possible only with
elimination of borders for goods movement as such, which could be achieved only
with establishment of a customs union. As discussed in the section 4.2 on FTA, this
option is disadvantageous to Ukraine, given the importance of its trade with countries
outside of the EU. If Ukraine does not form a customs union with the EU, customs
procedures and the associated costs will remain. Yet, substantial efficiency gains can
be obtained by streamlining border procedures and eliminating corruption at the
customs service (CEPS, 2006).
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Note: * CEEC7 are Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.
Table 6. Empirical estimates on benefits from market access 
Study Elements of single market
Estimated benefit from Single
Market, % GDP
Baldwin et al.
(1997) All
CEEC-7*: 1.5-18.8 %
(the more optimistic
case involves reduction
of risk premium)
EU-15: 0.2 %
Lejour et al.
(2001)
All 
Hungary: 9% GDP;
Poland: 5.8% GDP
CEEC-7*: 5.3% GDP
EU-15: 0-0.1% GDP
Maliszewska
(2004)
- Common external tariff;
- Elimination of border costs and delays;
- Reduced cost of compliance with
  national standards and regulations
Hungary: 7% GDP;
Poland: 3.4% GDP
EU-15: 0-0.17 %GDP
Costs of harmonization
Adaptation of the EU product standards and administrative procedures will be a
difficult task for Ukraine. CEE countries got substantial financial assistance for
harmonization with the EU, and it is unlikely that Ukraine will get comparable funds
unless it becomes an applicant for EU membership. The assessment of the costs of
harmonization is a very difficult exercise, both conceptually and technically. The
conceptual difficulty is that from a long-term prospective many expenses on
improvement of product safety, environmental quality, administrative procedures and
the like are not costs, but rather investments, as they lead to improvement of the
economic environment and quality of life. In the short-term, the expenses may be
substantial, yet in the long term they will turn into benefits. Therefore, the main
question in the area of harmonization should be about the proper timing and
sequencing, so that the shock of short-term expenses does not discourage from the
effort. A related difficulty lies in separating the expenses incurred due to harmonization
with the EU from those that would be incurred in any case as a part of general
modernization and improvement of the economy. Finally, it is often technically
impossible to calculate how much a change of standards or procedures will cost. 
There were some attempts to estimate the costs of compliance in the CEE countries
in the course of their accession to the EU. The cost of compliance in the agricultural
sector is especially high. So, in Poland the costs of the dairy sector adjustment were
estimated at PLN 15.5 billion (EUR 3.7 billion) in 1999 (CEN, 2003, p. 126); the
investments in the area of environment – at EUR 30.4 billion (CEN, 2003, p. 155)21.
The total costs of compliance in the agricultural sector in Poland and Lithuania were
estimated at 2-2.5% of GDP (CEPS, 2006, p. 89). The EU helped the accession
countries to cover a large part of these costs (up to 75%); it is not clear whether
anything similar will be available for Ukraine. Therefore, whenever possible, Ukraine
should make calculations of the investments needed for harmonization and reform. In
particular, enterprise surveys should be conducted in order to get an idea about the
kind and the size of expenses that businesses are going to bear as a result of
integration with the EU market. Then the government should figure out how such
expenses have to be financed and distributed over time. 
4.4.3. Liberalization of trade in services?
Full liberalization of services means freedom to provide services and freedom of
establishment. For the EU-Ukraine service trade, it would mean that based on the
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21 At the same time, it is expected that by 2020 the accumulated benefits from improvement of environmental
standards will accrue to EUR 41- 208 bn (mainly due to improved health of the population).
principle of reciprocity, selling specific services would not be restricted neither in the
EU nor in Ukraine. Similarly, neither Ukraine nor the EU should restrict the
establishment of a company or a subsidiary with respect to the nationality of owners
or providers of services. The welfare gains stemming from the more efficient
allocation of resources should in this case be positive, and felt mainly at the Ukrainian
market (see OCED 2005 for an overview of possible welfare effects for such a country
as Ukraine). In addition, liberalization of some services (like transport, financial and
insurance services etc.) can bring positive spillovers in the form of new foreign direct
investment that are needed in Ukraine.
How likely is it that the service trade between Ukraine and the EU is significantly
liberalized? It seems that the progress in the liberalisation of service flows will be
very gradual. Even the EU15 has not yet managed to establish fully functioning
internal market for services yet. The most regulated areas are transport, retail
trade and telecommunication (Vogt, 2005). Barriers in service trade between the
old and new members are even greater. For this reason, significant liberalisation
of service trade between the EU and Ukraine does not look to be a feasible option
in the close future.
However, given the future liberalisation agenda under GATS (General Agreement on
Trade in Services within the WTO, see section 4.1.2 of this report on Ukraine’s WTO
offer) and some common projects planned in the close future, it is possible that there
will be steps forward on easing restrictions at least on some types of services between
the EU and Ukraine. They will most likely include transport, telecommunication and
financial services. The overview of possible steps easing the barriers in the transport
and telecommunication sectors is given in the next subsections22.
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22 Liberalisation of financial services is discussed elsewhere in the report (see for example section 4.5).
Box 4.3. EU-Ukraine service trade
The current pattern of EU-Ukraine trade in services is typical for the North-South type of
trade. The EU is the net buyer of transport services, which mainly reflects bad infrastructure
in Ukraine and restricted market access. As for travels, the Ukrainians are net buyers.
Communication services are not an important part of the EU-Ukraine trade, however, the
EU here is the net buyer. The EU also imports professional, merchanting and technical
services from Ukraine, which probably reflects mainly outflow of high-skilled Ukrainian
workers. The EU sells to Ukraine ICT-intensive services like computer and financial services,
as well as capital intensive services like construction. Overall, Ukraine-EU service flows
accounted in 2003 for less than 1% of the total EU external service flows.
Transport
Increasing the effectiveness of the transport connection between the EU and Ukraine
is one of the major preconditions for markets integration, as well as a good
opportunity for Ukraine to play a transport hub role. The reform effort should include
the development of infrastructure and, even more important, institutional and
regulatory reform of the sector. Integration into Pan-European transport networks
may facilitate these processes; it can also help the EU with building a large integrated
and competitive transport networks. 
EU-Ukraine cooperation in the aviation sector is quite advanced: in December 2005
the parties agreed to form a single air space, which will mean in fact Ukraine’s
integration into the European aviation market. Ukraine will need to fully adopt the
EU’s acquis in this area, which will involve substantial liberalisation of the market,
certification of Ukrainian planes and adaptation of a range of environmental and
safety standards. 
Another priority area in the transport sector is Ukraine’s participation in the pan-
European transport corridors of rail and roads. The EU-Ukraine action plan envisages
integration of Ukraine’s transport infrastructure into the European transport networks
including Pan-European Transport Corridors, the Black Sea and the TRACECA
corridor. Pan-European Transport Corridors are ten routes in the Central and Eastern
Europe that the EU defined as priority for investment in 1995-2010. Ukraine is a party
to three of them23. TRACECA (TRAnsport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia) is one of four
Euro-Asian Land Transport Corridors, also called a ‘New Silk Road’. It should result in
creation of a railway line that will follow the ancient Silk Road from the Chinese port of
Lianyungang on the Yellow Sea to the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi on the Black
Sea and then on into Western Europe. Ukraine’s participation at these corridors will
hopefully help attract the much needed investments in the rail and road infrastructure.
It would be important for the EU to link the provision of assistance and investment to
the conduct of reforms in the sector and increasing its competitiveness.
Communications
Ukraine’s communications sector could potentially be fully integrated with that of the
EU. Ukraine’s WTO accession will bring substantial liberalization of the Ukrainian
market and facilitate the mutual market access between the EU and Ukraine. Ukraine
could then further integrate with the EU by adopting EU’s acquis on
telecommunications. As with all other infrastructure sectors, the challenge for
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23 They are Corridor III: Brussels-Aachen-Köln-Dresden-Wrocław-Katowice-Kraków-Lviv-Kiev; Corridor V:
Venice-Trieste/Koper-Ljubljana-Maribor-Budapest-Uzhhorod-Lviv-Kiev; and Corridor IX: Branch B –
Kaliningrad to Kiev.
Ukraine would be to upgrade the infrastructure and to make the sector more
competitive. Ukraine’s mobile communications sector is quite competitive and has
attracted substantial foreign investment. Yet, its fixed telephony is still monopolized
by the state company Ukrtelecom. To make this segment efficient and to attract the
much needed investment, Ukraine should speed up Ukrtelecom’ privatization. The EU
could also help Ukraine strengthen its regulatory bodies – the Antimonopoly
Committee and the Communications Regulation Commission so as to make them
capable of ensuring a proper competitive environment in the sector.
4.4.4. Integration of energy networks
The EU sees integration of its neighbours in the Pan-European energy markets as
an important component of enhancing EU’s energy security. The EU itself does not
have yet an integrated energy market of its own and is currently undertaking major
reform and integration efforts aimed at creating a common energy market in the
EU. In particular, the Green Paper on energy, launched in March 2006, suggest
that the EU should create common gas and electricity markets. Importantly, the
integration agenda involves many reform elements directed at raising the
efficiency of the sector. 
Ukraine’s energy situation makes it very desirable for Ukraine to join the integrated
European energy market. First, Ukraine is by far the most important transit country
for Russian gas (about 80% of Russian gas exports to the EU go through Ukraine).
Second, Ukraine has big gas storage capacity that could be used for creation of gas
reserves not only for Ukraine, but also for the EU. Third, Ukraine is not self-sufficient
in energy and, thus, need to cooperate closely with others to ensure its energy security.
Fourth, Ukraine has substantial electricity generation capacity and, therefore, could
trade in electricity. Yet, most importantly, Ukrainian energy sector needs reform, and
integration In the European market can serve as a powerful catalyst of the much
needed reforms. In particular, there is a need to introduce market pricing for energy
and to introduce more competition in the sector. The current EU energy policy
initiatives are directed exactly at these goals, so that by adopting the EU acquis on
energy would help Ukraine make its energy sector efficient.  
Ukraine is already participating in several European energy initiatives, the major of
them being Energy Charter Treaty and INOGATE program. The Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT) is an international24 institution that sets common rules for the energy sector. They
include rules on trade, transit, investment and movement of key personnel. The ECT
also includes a dispute settlement mechanism for private-state disputes in the energy
78
Małgorzata Jakubiak, Anna Kolesnichenko (eds.)
CASE Reports No. 66
24 Currently, the ECT signatories are predominantly European and NIS countries, plus Japan and Mongolia.
sector. INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) program covers
primarily NIS region and is financed by the EU. Its goal is to strengthen the European
energy security by assisting oil and gas networks integration and development.
Ukraine’s participation in both of these initiatives is useful in that they provide a
framework for solution of energy problems and promoting regional energy integration.
Yet, both of them fall short of supporting Ukraine’s deep integration into the EU energy
market. An example of the arrangement that would do so is the Energy Community
Treaty for Southeast Europe. The Treaty was signed in October 2005 and envisages full
integration of South Eastern European Countries in the European gas and electricity
markets. The Treaty envisages that countries-participants will fully adopt EU’s energy
acquis.  The idea of Ukraine’s inclusion in this Treaty should be given serious thought,
as it will provide fuller integration with the EU and will be more efficient in stimulating
reforms due to it binding nature. At the December 2005 Summit, the EU and Ukraine
have signed a memorandum that envisages gradual integration of Ukrainian gas and
electricity sector into the European market. Ukraine’s integration in the EU electricity
sector is already quite advanced and Ukraine is making preparations to join the Union
for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE).
4.4.5. Financing of co-operation – the ENPI
The co-operation between EU and Ukraine has been financially supported by the EU
and this will continue. In fact, available resources are expected to increase
significantly starting from 2007. 
The EU has been the largest donor to Ukraine, with the assistance amounting close to
2.5 billion euro since 1991. The major instrument for this was a TACIS programme,
including its nuclear safety component. In 2005-2006, annual assistance amounted to
around 150 million euro annually, almost entirely in the TACIS framework. The
priorities of EU assistance were set in ‘National Indicative Programmes’. 2002-2003
programme identified as its priorities: legal, judicial and administrative reform, border
management, business, trade and investment promotion, civil society, training and
education, and social reform. 
Starting from 2007 TACIS will be replaced by a new assistance instrument: European
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), directly related to the ENP. The
idea behind its creation draws lessons from the experience of implementation of TACIS,
MEDA and other EU programmes – the need for more room for country-specific
approach, better co-ordination between various EU aid instruments and better
institutional setup for implementation (Commission staff, 2004). Overall level of funding
from ENPI during 2007-2013 is expected to increase by some 30% compared to the
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previous financial perspective. The details on the final shape of ENPI resources that will
be made available for Ukrainian programs are yet to be decided. The allocation of
resources will be primarily determined by (1) the priorities set up in the Action plan
taking into account evaluation of the progress in fulfilling the Plan, (2) Ukrainian
initiative in suggesting specific fields or types of programmes, (3) EU and EU member
states initiative in promoting particular fields or types of programmes, and, at a later
stage (4) overall developments in the EU-Ukrainian relations and experience with
implementations of earlier TACIS and ENPI programmes.
ENPI funds and closer integration in the ENP framework are likely to be concentrated
on neighbour countries making most progress in political and economic reforms. Such
a strategy is perceived by many actors as the best way to motivate non-EU countries to
work on improved relations with the EU and on domestic reform agenda, although
introduction of conditionality elements may be controversial and difficult to accept by
some neighbour countries – e.g. from North Africa (see discussion in Jakubiak and
Paczynski, 2006). Interestingly, there appears to be general public support for applying
such an incentive mechanism in EU relations with its neighbours. In a recent
Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer, 2006) 64% of respondents in the EU25 agreed
with a statement that the EU should reduce its relations with the neighbouring
countries showing no willingness to progress in reforms.
4.4.6. Conclusions
Ukraine’s integration into the EU common market can potentially bring large
benefits, and it is surely the way to follow in the longer term. Experience of CEE
countries suggest that such gains could be in the range of 3-9% of GDP. They come
from the reduction in border costs and non-tariff barriers. Yet, the extent of Ukraine’s
integration in the European market is going to be limited, at least for the near future,
as deeper integration takes time and requires many internal regulatory reforms, done
according to the European template.
Ukraine can potentially go as far as full integration in the European energy, transport
and telecommunication sectors. The integration will stimulate liberalisation and
reform of these sectors in Ukraine. Upgrading infrastructure and enhancing
competition in the infrastructure sectors will be the major challenges for Ukraine and,
therefore, should be the focus of the EU assistance.
ENPI can provide sufficient resources for financing projects that important for both
sides. The extent to which Ukraine will be able to use the full potential of ENPI will be
partly determined by the ability of the country to formulate and promote its priorities.
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4.5. Challenges for deep integration: free
capital mobility
4.5.1. Introduction
Removing impediments to foreign investment flows, discussed in section 3.9, is the
first step of a broader capital account liberalization implied by the action plan. The
sides also had to start consultations to determine the goals of future liberalization.
While the official reports on action plan offer little information on the progress of such
consultations, there were several announcements by the NBU representatives to
liberalize the capital account by 200925. Besides, the ‘Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement’ (article 2.3.3) explicitly maintains the requirements of non-restricted
payments in foreign currency, free movement of capital connected to FDI, abstaining
from additional restrictions, and guaranteed protection of foreign investments.
Here, in this section, we go beyond the commitments of the PCA and examine
prospects for full capital account liberalisation in Ukraine. We analyze potential
challenges Ukraine can face in planning and implementing the liberalization of capital
flows. We first discuss briefly the fundamental preconditions for capital account
liberalization and diagnose readiness of the Ukrainian economy and institutions to
support it. Then we examine experience of the new EU members and accession
countries in sequencing the liberalization and coordinating it with other policies to
conclude on the most likely scenario and prospects for the liberalization in Ukraine.
With growing integration of Ukraine into the European and global financial markets
capital controls are losing their effectiveness and tend to become a matter of higher
transaction costs rather than a binding constraint. Currently Ukraine controls almost
each type of capital transactions26, at the same time the existing numerous controls
are not systematic, lack consistency and symmetry in treating inflows vs. outflows,
residents vs. non residents. The framework regulation in the NBU decree ‘About the
system of foreign exchange regulation and foreign exchange control’27 is extended by
numerous idiosyncratic legislative acts thus making the system quite cumbersome and
complicated. Current restrictions on the outflows are stricter than those on the
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25 Announcement by Oleksandr Savchenko, Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine on ‘Ukraine’s
Capital Markets  2006’ International Forum, June 14, 2006, 
http://www.ufs.kiev.ua/news/archive.php?Date=20060614#103109.
26 See classification in Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 2005,
International Monetary Fund.
27 Decree of the National bank of Ukraine #15-93 ‘About the system of foreign exchange regulation and foreign
exchange control’, February 19, 2003.
inflows trying to discourage capital flight from the country. Restrictions on outflows,
naturally, discourage inflows also, thus creating additional bottlenecks for foreign
investments. At the same time, enforcement of controls rests on purely administrative
tools – licenses of regulators to perform a certain transaction. 
Easing of a bulk of the existing restrictions is an inevitable step to make given that the
European Commission asked the potential member countries for opening their capital
accounts prior to accession. More important, most economists agree that capital
account liberalization is likely to increase the volume of investment inflow as
international investors react to the improved investment environment (Buiter and
Taci, 2002; B.Johnson, 1998). Other probable benefits are better portfolio
diversification and lower financing costs and stronger fiscal discipline because of
capital flight threat (Buiter and Taci, 2002). Besides, capital controls proved
ineffective in many countries and simply inflate the costs of capital movement,
because it is technically hard to prevent illegal transactions (Arvai, 2005). 
4.5.2. Potential risks of capital account liberalization
There are widespread fears that in a country such as Ukraine, the liberalization of
short-term flows can be risky. These fears are based on the fact that if the liberalization
lacks coordination with macroeconomic policies, its costs can also be quite
pronounced. Namely, if prudent macroeconomic policies are not in place and the
regulatory environment is bad and unstable, free cross-border capital movements
entail higher volatility of both inflows and outflows. Therefore, the opinion is that a
country should have mature financial system in place prior to large scale liberalization.
A liberalizing country needs also to achieve sound macroeconomic fundamentals
before opening up. Classical textbook impossible trinity argument suggests that in
case of fixed exchange rate, simultaneously controlled exchange rate (like it is in the
case of Ukraine) and free capital mobility, the risk of financial crisis is increasing. In
other words, fixed exchange rate under free capital mobility means abandoned
independent monetary policy. Or – to change monetary target and stop fixing the
exchange rate. However, if we stay with the pegged exchange rate, like in nowadays
Ukraine, it requires that the central bank changes money supply in response to capital
inflow/outflow to keep the exchange rate stable and cannot use that instrument to
maintain stability of domestic prices. For the commitment to be credible, it also
requires sound public finances. This is clearly not the issue in Ukraine now, hence the
criticism of 'early liberalizations'.
However, even this criticism does not prevent fast liberalization of capital flows. The
major challenges is to plan the liberalization in a way that potential risks and costs
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are minimized and well managed, including the diminished ability to pursue
autonomous monetary policy and exchange rate stability simultaneously, together
with unbalanced public finances. If this is done, the vulnerability of the domestic
financial system to volatile financial flows will not be high.
4.5.3. Prerequisites for capital account liberalization
Capacity of the financial system to manage risks
This includes implementing risk-based supervision, strengthened risk management
skills of financial institutions and regulators, modern accounting standards.
• Risk-based approach. Prudential supervision and regulation have to rely on risk-
based methodologies rather than retrospective approach of monitoring
prudential indicators. In simple words, when assessing soundness of a financial
institution the NBU and the State Commission for Regulation of Financial
Services Markets in Ukraine (CRFSM)28 have to put substantial weight on
quality of its risk management procedures (see section 3.4.3 of this report).
• Risk management in financial institutions. Free (or semi-free) capital flows
complicate risk management because of increased macroeconomic risks and
more volatile financial flows. To meet the challenge the Ukrainian banks, first of
all, will have to upgrade management of exchange rate and maturity risks. We
perceive those as priorities given current mismatches in both areas.
Dollarization of assets and liabilities of Ukrainian banks is persistently increasing for
the last several years. As of end 2006 Q2 foreign currency denominated loans made
some 45% of total credit portfolio and deposits in foreign currency - almost 40% of total
deposits. Banks bear noticeable exchange rate risks and in the nearest future will have
to address the problem, aggravated by the absence of hedging instruments on the
market – derivative securities are barely used. And it is unlikely those can become
available soon – issuing and circulation of derivatives remains unregulated. State Stock
Market and Securities Commission is responsible agency for preparing a draft law on
derivatives and had to pass a draft law to the Parliament for their consideration in July
2006. Currently the draft law is available for revision by the public on the
Commission’s webpage, however it has not been passed to the Parliament yet and the
perspectives of its consideration are vague. Meanwhile, the banks and other deposit-
taking institutions need to resort to less reliable methods to control exchange rate risks,
like constant monitoring and matching of foreign currency assets and liabilities. 
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28 Regulates and supervises non-banking financial institutions in Ukraine.
Maturity risks emanate from limited possibilities for Ukrainian banks to attract long-term
debt and deposits. At the same time since 2003 one has been observing rampant (long
term) mortgage crediting and expanding investment. In 2005 mortgage credits of
Ukrainian banks grew 340% and reached some 8% of the total credit portfolio. The
demand for long term loans should persist in the near perspective as retail banking is now
a main driving force of bank portfolio expansion. In 2006Q1 household credits grew at
16.3% yoy (+7.4% 2005 Q1). Therefore, even under controlled capital transactions high-
skill maturity risks management becomes critical. Opening capital account can bring
much more short-term inflows and pose much tighter requirements to curb maturity risks.
Obviously quality of risk management procedures has to be reflected in prudential
assessments of the NBU. While those are at the mere development stage, NBU announced
several times that they considered restrictions on the banks to provide foreign currency
denominated loans to households. Such restriction, if exercised, can increase the costs of
credits to borrowers, while failing to address deeper problems of macroeconomic
misbalances and inadequate exchange rate management by domestic banks.
• Management of risks by regulators. Responding to the surge in private capital
flows to the transition countries in early 90s, many countries tried different
policies to manage the excessive flows. Options considered included sterilization
through open market operations, changing reserve requirements, fiscal
tightening/easing. The consensus seems to be that each of policies tried involved
significant side effects, sometimes larger than costs of large scale capital inflows
(IMF Approach to Capital Account liberalization). Price-based controls, like
unremunerated reserve requirements discussed in section 3, showed some
effectiveness in discouraging speculative inflows. 
While usefulness of policy tools is questioned in academic literature, the ability of
regulators to monitor and analyze cross-border transactions is perceived critical.
Ukrainian regulators, first of all, will need to improve balance of payments statistics
and monitoring of cross-border financial flows.
Change of monetary policy regime. 
As already discussed free capital movement leave two monetary policy options –
floating exchange rate – inflation targeting and fixed exchange rate – abandoned
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29 Announcement by Oleksandr Savchenko, Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine on ‘Ukraine’s
Capital Markets  2006’ International Forum, June 14, 2006,
http://www.ufs.kiev.ua/news/archive.php?Date=20060614#103109
inflation management. The central bank of Ukraine declared plans to move to
inflation targeting29. There is little certainty when inflation targeting can be
implemented and whether the NBU makes any attempts to coordinate the transition
to inflation targeting with capital account liberalization measures. Experience of CEE
countries (see next subsection) suggests that inflation targeting sets strict
requirements to quality of statistics collected by the central bank and to its analytic
and macroeconomic forecasting capacities. Functioning securities market is another
necessary condition to avail reliable instruments for open market operations. Those
are the steps yet to be completed by the Ukrainian monetary authority. Development
of the respective capacities, in our opinion, can take at least 2-3 years.
4.5.4. Liberalizing experience of other countries
During the 1990s, the eight new EU members30 were liberalizing their capital
accounts as they were integrating into the EU economy. The speed and sequence of
liberalization varied depending on country’s starting conditions and macroeconomic
developments during the transition period. The IMF and EU encouraged
liberalization in general; the specifics, however, were driven mostly by the country
authorities’ agenda, in some cases purely ideological.
Two main groups can be distinguished among eight new EU members: rapid
liberalizers (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and cautious
liberalizers (Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia). Different starting
conditions played an important role in developing a liberalization strategy. For
instance, relatively high external debt in Hungary and Poland made these countries
more vulnerable to external shocks and their authorities opted for a more cautious
approach toward liberalizing capital flows.
4.5.5. Implications for future capital account
liberalizations in Ukraine
As comparative analysis of eight new EU members suggests almost all countries
liberalized:
• direct investments prior to other capital movements,
• inflows before outflows,
• long term flows before short-term flows.
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30 Eight new EU members – new member states of EU: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia.
Even if asymmetric liberalization of inflows vis-à-vis outflows can be justified by
potential capital flights, recent macroeconomic performance of the Ukrainian
economy and high return to capital (relative to the EU economies) should allow to
keep symmetry in liberalizing an inflow simultaneously with the respective outflow.
This way residents are treated in the same way as non-residents, but more importantly
postponing liberalization of outflow wipes out benefits of free capital inflows. 
Ukraine has already made reasonable progress in liberalizing direct investment flows
(section 3.9). Likewise in eight new EU members foreign investments were the
starting point of liberalization sequence well before the liberalization of other capital
movements. Now the challenge is to carefully sequence future liberalization of capital
flows and, more important, start such liberalization in a concerted effort with
introducing inflation targeting and broader financial sector reform agenda.
4.5.6. Conclusions
Macroeconomic performance and institutional capacities of the financial market
regulators allow to begin liberalization of capital flows in the nearest future. First of all,
a new framework law regulating trans-border capital flows is needed to replace the
current numerous idiosyncratic regulations. A new law should unambiguously declare
free capital mobility and absence of control of any kind as an ultimate objective of
liberalization. Stock market operations, long-term credits, purchase of real estate for
investments and other long term flows can be eased already in 2007.
Liberalization of short-term flows should be postponed until inflation targeting and
floating exchange rate regime are operational. Simultaneously, the central bank
should work to introduce risk based supervision of financial institutional and
enhances internal capacity to forecast and manage volatile short-term inflows. This
will require coordination of liberalization policy with introducing inflation targeting
and broader financial sector development program. We believe that it is realistic to
implement all complementary measures within the next three years so that by 2009
Ukraine can have regulation of capital flows coherent with OECD standards provided
convertible currency combined with inflation targeting.
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4.6. Challenges for deep integration: movement
of labour
The goal of this section is to discuss institutional impediments for liberalization of
labour markets of Ukraine and EU. Obviously, the long-run strategy to deal with the
problem of labour emigration is to improve the welfare of Ukrainian population.
However, as of now the state has no tools to limit emigration of labour force from
Ukraine (except for administrative ones). Thus, the primary goal of Ukrainian
government should be to protect those Ukrainians which chose to work abroad. This
chapter discusses how this can be done given current institutional constrains.
4.6.1. Introduction
Since early 1990’s labour emigration from Ukraine to Central and Western European
countries became an essential element of labour flows on the European continent.
Driven by the necessity to improve living conditions following deep transitory
economic crises migrants were searching for employment opportunities abroad.
Given geographical proximity, stable demand for cheap eastern labour and tolerable
migration policies, EU and EU candidate countries became one of the major
destinations for Ukrainian labour migrants.
The importance of labour migration from Ukraine to the EU labour market can be
illustrated by such a fact: according to the EU Commission estimates, on the eve of
the EU enlargement about 0.6 million of workers from 10 candidate countries were
illegally working in the EU market (European Commission, 2001b). At the same time,
all estimates of Ukrainian illegal labour emigration to EU give comparable or much
higher numbers.
Immigration of third-country nationals for employment in EU has always raised acute
political and economic debates. In its recent report on the Functioning of the
Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty the European
Commission concludes than two years after the EU enlargement labour ‘immigration
from non-EU countries is a much more important phenomenon than intra-EU
mobility, both within the EU-15 and the EU-25’ (European Commission, 2006).
Obviously, Ukrainian labour migrants contribute substantially to formation of
overall labour movements within the Europe. Being one of the mostly populated
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European states and given wide gaps in economic and social indicators between
Ukraine and EU, the country’s potential impact over the European labour market
can hardly be overestimated. However, up to now Ukraine has been known in
Europe as a source of cheap workforce employed in labour intensive sectors with
minimum utilization of human capital. Such a reputation results from the fact that
overwhelming majority of labour migrants from Ukraine take illegal jobs in
construction, agriculture or domestic sector.
Ukrainian labour market underwent substantial changes in 1990s. The share of labour
employed in industry and agriculture sharply reduced. Structural reforms led to
drastic increase in the number of unemployed. According to ILO (International
Labour Organization) methodology, the unemployment rate exceeded 7% in the latest
decade and in 1999 it reached the maximum of 11.9%. Increasing income gaps in
Ukraine and EU countries heated up the interest of Ukrainians toward employment
opportunities abroad. Dismantling of migration barriers after fall of communist
regime opened the labour market of Eastern and Western European countries to
Ukrainian nationals. This started a long and controversial history of modern labour
emigration from Ukraine.
4.6.2. Ukraine-EU labour migration regulation
In most cases legislation of the EU Member States treats Ukrainian migrant workers
as other third-country nationals with no specific preferences. A Ukrainian worker
seeking admission to the labour market of one of the EU Member States for purposes
of employment or self-employment has to comply with national regulations of the that
Member on general terms.
A typical tool to restrain access of third-country nationals to the EU labour market is
labour market need test. Only if an EU employer cannot satisfy demand for a worker
with a particular qualification at the expense of the overall EU labour market
resources, Ukrainians (or any third-country national) can be granted permission for
employment. Some EU countries also introduce general yearly quotas for admission
of third-country nationals. In that case a Ukrainian worker must also fall in the
general quota unless special quotas for Ukrainians are introduced.
The only document containing provisions on terms of labour migration between EU
and Ukraine is PCA. The PCA grants Community company or company in Ukraine
established in the territory of Ukraine or the Community respectively employ or have
employed by one of its subsidiaries or branches key personnel (persons occupying
senior position within a company or person who processes uncommon knowledge).
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In its essence the provision of PCA regarding intra-corporate transferees is identical to
the commitment that the EU made during negotiations on Mode 4 of service provision
under GATS, and which is included in the EU’s Schedule of commitments. However,
under the PCA Ukrainian companies do not have all preferences that are provided for
companies located in WTO member states. Ukraine’s accession to the WTO will widen
the scope of labour mobility since Ukrainian companies will have preferences related
to 4th mode of service supply.
Some regulations relevant to labour mobility between Ukraine and EU are
specified in bilateral agreements between Ukraine and individual Member States.
As of June 2006 Ukraine has bilateral employment agreement with 6 EU countries:
Portugal, Poland, Check Republic, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania (see Annex 2).
Although bilateral agreements with five latter countries were signed before EU
enlargement in 2004, these countries’ accession to the EU did not alter the validity
of the documents.
The EU enlargement affected the institutional setting for legal migration between the EU
and Ukraine in a marginal way. The major changes are related to the following areas:
• All the EU-10 countries introduced visa for Ukrainians while before May 2004 a
number of countries (e.g. Poland, Hungary) provided visa-free short-term travel
regime. As a rule these countries temporarily provide all or some types of visas
free of charge. Since 2004 transaction costs related to both legal and illegal
labour migration to the EU-10 increased.
• All the EU-10 members became signatories to PCA agreement and are obliged to
provide preferences for labour movement specified in the document. Ukraine, in
turn, provides similar treatment toward EU-10 workers.
• After the EU enlargement, the EU-10 nationals must be, ceteris paribus preferred
over third-country nationals by the EU-15 employers. Ukrainians searching for a
legal employment in EU-15 since May 2004 have lower chances of passing labour
market need test due to tougher competition on the side of EU-10 nationals.
Two latter changes did not have noticeable impact over dynamics of labour migration
between EU and Ukraine. However, introduction of visa regime with EU-10 countries
affected both legal and illegal migrants moving to the EU-10 countries. EU-10’s
joining to Schengen agreement will alter the preferential visa arrangements for
Ukrainians. All EU-10 countries will have to charge fees for visas and establish more
rigid visa regulations. As part of the Schengen deal new Member States will have to
strengthen border controls with its neighbours including Ukraine.
Social protection agreement are usually complementary to international employment
agreements and guarantee migrant workers the right to benefit from social
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contributions made throughout the working period in countries which are the parties
of agreements. Currently Ukraine has agreements on coordination of social security
systems with a number of EU Member States: Spain (singed in 1996), Estonia (1997),
Latvia (1998), Slovakia (2001), Check Republic (2001), and Lithuania (2002).
4.6.3. Migration trends
According to several alternative studies, the overall stock of Ukrainian labour
migrants accumulated from late 1990s until early 2000s is estimated at the level of
0.8-2 million persons. Although some sources provide much higher numbers (up to
7 million), such information is based purely on guesses and intuition and has no
reliable analytical underpinnings. One should keep in mind that recently little
attention and very limited resources have been given to conduct in-depth analysis of
labour out-migration trends in Ukraine and most of reliable researches date back to
years 2001-2002.
The latest dull-fledged research of labour migration trends was completed in 2001.
The State Statistics Committee of Ukraine conducted a survey of 18 000 households
in 8 regions (oblasts). The number of labour emigrants in the selected 8 oblasts was
estimated at the level of 380 000 persons. Extrapolation to the whole country gives
about 800 000 labour migrants. Although Russia accounted for about 37% of total
labour emigrants from Ukraine, the geographical structure of migration was
obviously biased toward Europe. According to the survey about 60% of all migrants
were employed in countries which are currently the members of the enlarged EU. The
most attractive destinations for Ukrainians were Poland (about 18% of migrants),
Check Republic (17%), Italy (8.5%), and Portugal (3.8%). 
According to the most recent survey of 300 households in 8 western regions of
Ukraine the ranking of most popular immigration countries changed somewhat. Out
of 10 most frequently popular immigration countries, 7 are the EU member state. Italy
tops the list of most desired destinations with 60% of votes, than come Portugal (31%),
Spain (24%) and Poland (23%)31.
Estimated number of migrants contrasts with official statistics on labour migration
provided by State Statistics Committee. Official data on Ukrainian legal labour
migrants show much more modest numbers. In 2005 more than 56 500 permits have
been given to Ukrainian nationals for employment abroad. Current EU Member
States have been among the most attractive destinations for Ukrainians throughout
last decade (see Annexes 3 and 4).
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31 Respondents could pick more than one country.
Since 1996 over 65% of work permits have been given to workers going to EU
countries. The role of EU-15 in providing Ukrainians with legal working places
decreased, however, during 2004, the year of EU enlargement. At the same time the
EU-10 countries became relatively more attractive to migrant workers from Ukraine.
One, however, should be cautious in interpreting the official statistics since there is a
big deal of inconsistency between Ukrainian data and data of destination EU
countries. For example, while domestic data say that in 2005 about 11 700 of
Ukrainian worked in Greece and 5 400 in UK the letter countries’ statistics does not
give any evidence of presence of Ukrainian legal workers in their labour market. One
the other hand, in some countries Ukrainian statistics underestimates the migration
size (see Annex 6 for example of Check Republic).
The true scale of Ukrainian labour migrants’ presence in Italy and Portugal was
revealed during regularization programs. In 2002 the Italian government ran a two-
month regularization program for domestic workers and contract workers. By the
deadline about 702 000 applications were received. Out of 341 000 of applications
from domestic workers, 27% (about 92 000) were submitted by Ukrainians. The
regularization program in Portugal lasted since January 2001 till March 2003. During
this period Ukrainian labour migrants submitted the largest number of applications
compared with other national migrant groups in Portugal. Out of 180 000 of
temporary work permits, over 62 000 were granted to Ukrainian.
4.6.4. Future policy options
Although intensive labour emigration has become an important element of transition
process the issue has never been given proper attention by Ukrainian authorities. All
initiatives of Government and Parliament addressing the problem of workforce out-
migration usually ended up with declarative documents or superficial measures.
Thus, concerns about inadequate authorities’ efforts in the sphere of labour migration
policy are justified. Government did not draft any single document giving
understanding and providing strategic vision of the state migration policy in short and
long run. As discussed earlier the institutional basis for managing labour migration
between Ukraine and EU remains very weak. Given intensive migratory outflows to
the labour market of several EU Member States, the Ukrainian government’s priority
should be to intensify analytical and regulatory work necessary to settle the migration-
related problem. This chapter is meant to give basic recommendation about possible
options of migration policy under existing institutional constraints.
Before developing recommendations about future policy options on mutual
liberalization of labour markets by Ukraine and EU we propose review of major
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impediments that complicate full-scale dismantling of barriers for movement of labour
between Ukraine and EU. We distinguish impediments which are specific to (i) Ukraine,
(ii) EU and (iii) equally important for both parties. Major obstacles for Ukraine’s
participation in common Ukraine-EU labour market can be summarized as follows:
• Ukraine has no experience of functioning zones of free movement of labour with
other countries. No essential progress in liberalization of labour markets was
achieved with FSU (Former Soviet Union) countries within the CIS or CEA32.
Although the FSU countries have very similar labour market institutions and
comparable economic indicators (which makes migration potential moderate),
the issue of zone of free movement of labour remains one of the most
problematic and disputable one. Functioning ‘zone of free movement of labour’
between Ukraine and other FSU countries could serve as a ‘natural’ experiment
and provide a valuable informational base for negotiations between EU and
Ukraine on labour market liberalization.
• Ukraine’s labour market lacks efficient institutions providing flexibility to it. Once
barriers for movement of workers are substantially reduced, EU employers are
likely to be more efficient in recruiting high-skilled labour from Ukraine. This
might lead to sustainable selective outflows of high-skilled workers from Ukraine.
• High school standards of Ukraine are not always consistent with those valid in the
EU countries. Procedures of mutual recognitions of diplomas are complicated,
expensive, and time-consuming. High-skilled workers might experience
difficulties in obtaining positions adequate to their educational level and
qualification. This might lead to loss of skills and experience, and subsequently
reduce human capital of migrant employees in the long run.
Impediments on the side of EU can be summarized as follows:
• During four waves of the EU enlargement certain formal and informal rules and
procedures of labour market liberalization have been established. The common
rule is that zone of free movement of labour is a feasible option only after zone
of free movement of goods, services and capital has been formed.
• Population and policy makers of most EU countries are sceptical about further
opening of labour market for third-country nationals. The general tendency is to
toughen the migration policy and limit access of third-country national to the EU
countries. Recent disorders in France, organized by migrant population
dissatisfied with their social status, aggravated the situation. Following such
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32 CEA – Common Economic Area established by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2003, aiming at
deeper integration of the four market. The integration will start from the establishment of free trade zone.
However, the most possible final shape of such union is still unknown.
disorders, negative label of ‘migrant’ is usually attached to all third-country
nationals irrespective of religion and nationality.
• Politicians are very cautious about opening of labour markets even in case when
migration potential is estimated to be minimal. On the eve of 2004 EU
enlargement most estimates predicted that labour migration from EU-10 to EU-
15 will be at the level of 1-1.5% of total EU-15 labour force. However, such
estimates were not perceived as trustworthy by populations and policy-makers.
• Any option of labour market liberalization is subject to long-term discussion
within the EU as well as between the EU and a negotiating country. Given that
EU Member States still have no common vision of policy toward migration of
third-country nationals for the purpose of employment or self-employment, any
substantial concessions in this sphere are possible only as a long-run (probably
a decade) perspective. No quick decision is possible in the short run.
Mutual impediments:
• Ukraine and EU have no experience of cooperation in the sphere of labour
market liberalization. PCA and Ukraine-EU action plan do not envisage any
substantial commitments as to the labour market opening. Besides, substantial
gap in labour market institutions of the EU and Ukraine complicates any quick
progress in this direction.
• Ukrainian is not a member of WTO by this time. Thus, its service providers are
not granted MFN regime in the EU market. EU still can not grant Ukraine
preferences as to the 4th mode of service provision (through temporary
migration of workers) defined in the GATS.
• Fulfilment of some of the obligations taken by Ukraine within the EU-Ukraine
action plan is not sufficient. In particular, Ukraine did not speed up coordination
of social policy with respect to persons employed legally abroad. This is an
impediment for further progress in liberalizing labour market between Ukraine
and EU since it creates a problem of lack of credibility as to the Ukraine’s
subsequent commitments.
Despite numerous obstacles for speedy liberalization of labour market between
Ukraine and EU, there are still a number of feasible options for further cooperation.
The actions proposed below should be viewed as a minimum set of priority
undertakings aimed on deeper integration of labour markets. If proposed measures
are not systematically implemented within reasonable period of time, perspectives of
successful integration of labour markets will remain vague and remote. The emphasis
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should be made on systematic character and consistency of measures within the
process rather than on the speed of the liberalization. Proposed measures include:
• Negotiate preferential access of Ukrainian workers to the EU labour market on
bilateral basis with individual Member States. Typically the preferences are
established though special quotas. If already specified quotas are fulfilled,
consider their extension.
• Negotiate bilateral agreements with EU Member States on coordination of social
protection of Ukrainian workers legally employed in the EU and EU workers
employed in Ukraine.
• Join WTO to receive the preferences granted by the EU under the Schedule of
commitments and concessions as to the temporary entry of service providers
(the 4th mode of service provision defined in GATS). Upon accession to the
WTO join the multilateral negotiations on the service market liberalization
within the Doha Round. Consider possible desired horizontal of sector-
specific requests to the EU concerning further liberalization of service
suppliers’ access to the EU markets. 
• Ensure functioning of zone of free movement of goods, services, and capital
between the EU and Ukraine. Fruitful negotiations on liberalization of labour
markets are feasible only after successful implementation of other three pillars
of common market.
All these measures should be implemented as a part of a long-run strategy of labour
market reforms. To ensure proper and in-time implementation of reforms a set of
intermediate success indicator must be designed and tough monitoring of the
implementation process must be ensured. At the same time, the government should
actively implement complementary measures, primarily taking unilateral actions
aimed on reduction of transaction costs related to labour migration. In particular,
special attention should be paid to:
• Reduction of transportation costs incurred by labour migrants. The strategy
should be to develop transport infrastructure, favour improvement of public
transportation services, and enhance competition of international carriers.
• Reduction of costs of remittances transfers. The strategy should be to foster
competition of financial intermediaries, favour internationalization of financial
services markets.
• Creation of preconditions for return labour migration through improving
business climate for SME development and favouring start-ups of micro
enterprises. Return migration will reduce the number of Ukrainian workers
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abroad and will weaken effects of migration networks in stimulating out-
migration from Ukraine.
• Harmonization of Higher Education standards with European ones. Implement
high school reforms in line with recommendations developed within Bologna
process. This will reduce costs of mutual recognition of diplomas of high-skilled
workers and favour search of job adequate to their educational level.
• Minimization of informational uncertainty for potential migrants. Disseminate
information through multiple sources, including web-portals of the
governmental bodies. As of now obtaining information related to migration
opportunities through open sources is a challenging task.
• Provision of legal support for potential migrants through specialized agencies; more
active involvement of consulates for protecting labour migrants’ interests abroad.
• Negotiation of simplified visa regime for Ukrainians coming to work abroad.
Ukraine granted short term visa-free regime for citizens of the EU and should
bargain for adequate concessions on the side of the EU.
4.6.5. Conclusions
Intensive labour emigration has become an important element of transition process
in Ukraine since early 1990s. According to different estimates, the overall number of
Ukrainian migrants working abroad equals to 0.8-2 million persons. Despite this, the
issue has never been given proper attention by Ukrainian authorities. All initiatives
of Government and Parliament were not efficient in addressing the problems of
labour migration from Ukraine. Given intensive migratory outflows to the labour
market of several EU Member States, the Ukrainian government’s priority should be
to intensify analytical and regulatory work necessary to settle the migration-related
problem. There are several possible options of labour migration policy that can be
implemented by Ukraine within short period of time unilaterally or in cooperation
with the EU. In particular, Ukraine may negotiate preferential access of Ukrainian
workers to the EU labour market on bilateral basis with individual Member States as
well as agreements on coordination of social protection of Ukrainian workers legally
employed in the EU. Ukraine’s joining WTO should also be perceived as a necessary
step toward further liberalization of movement of workers among Ukraine and the
EU. All these measures should be implemented as a part of a long-run strategy of
labour market reforms. 
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4.7. Challenges for deep integration:
EU perspective
Relations with Ukraine and deepening of integration in economic and other spheres is
clearly very important for the EU, as evident from various official declarations. Ukraine
is one the most populous countries bordering the enlarged EU, it plays an important
transit role for several goods imported by the EU from the east (notably, natural gas),
and is a significant player from the perspective of foreign and security policy. However,
one should also keep in mind that EU carries extensive dialogue with several other
countries, and for instance only the European Neighbourhood Policy applies to no less
than 16 countries. In economic terms, EU relations with Ukraine, while intensifying
over the last years are still a tiny fraction of EU relations with the rest of the world. For
example, in 2005, Ukraine ranked 32nd among major EU import markets (with a 0.7%
share in total EU imports, excluding intra-EU trade) and 21st among major EU export
markets (with a 1.2% share in total EU exports). EU foreign direct investments in
Ukraine were relatively low until 2005, when two big transactions significantly
increased inflows. It remains to be seen if Ukraine will be able to build an investment
climate that could ensure sustainable high FDI inflows.
4.7.1. ENP – new framework for EU external relations
The EU relations with its southern and eastern neighbours are carried in the ENP
framework, an initiative explicitly aiming at inclusion of non-EU neighbour states in
dialogue and co-operation so that no new dividing lines are built in Europe following
the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement waves. The EU offers a privileged relationship to
all neighbours effectively committed to common values (democracy and human
rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable
development). Apart from creating a mechanism for closer political dialogue, ENP
also envisages economic integration. On the other hand, it does not offer an accession
perspective to participating countries. In terms of practical implementation ENP is
designed as a de facto bilateral mechanism with the level of ambition of relationships
depending on the extent of political will and ability on the side of partner countries to
effectively work towards goals jointly agreed in action plans. Major differences in the
intensity of the dialogue are already visible and for example ENP has not yet been
activated in case of 3 out of 16 countries to which the initiative applied (Belarus, Libya
and Syria). By construction there is therefore large room for manoeuvre for
neighbouring countries in shaping relations in the way they consider most
advantageous and also an element of positive competition between a few EU
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neighbours interested in major intensification of relations with the EU. Russia is not
part of the ENP, since its relations with the EU have already earlier been shaped by
purely bilateral dialogue through a strategic partnership covering four ‘common
spaces’. Russia is, however, included in the same financial mechanism or de facto
ENP budget – the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).
Relations with Mediterranean countries have been governed by the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, launched at the 1995 Barcelona summit. There has never
been any serious debate on EU membership of EU Mediterranean partners. Instead
relations have focused on deepening economic co-operation in a very practical way.
A long-standing goal of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership was creating a Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010. All involved sides have been confirming their
commitment to achieving this objective. Naturally, the progress in economic
integration differs between partners. Morocco is one relatively positive example. The
country is also actively involved in ENP, joining Ukraine and other countries that
have adopted action plans already in early 2005. One important lessons stemming
from the experience of EU-Mediterranean partnership is that deepening economic
integration is possible even without political integration.
4.7.2. Determinants of EU approach to Ukraine
The EU approach to the relations with Ukraine (and other neighbour states) has been
driven by the following factors:
• willingness to effectively support social, economic and institutional transformation
of the country,
• political developments in Ukraine leading to at times somewhat vague Ukrainian
stance on the model of political relations with the EU, US, CIS (in particular
Russia) and other partners,
• differences in the EU member states perceptions on the optimal strategy that
could motivate Ukraine to pursue political and economic reforms and become a
friendly and solid EU partner in approaching various challenges faced by Europe.
EU relations with Ukraine are also – to a limited extent – linked to the EU relations
with Russia. This is because Ukraine plays a vital transit role bringing Russian (and
Central Asian) natural gas to EU customers. Natural oil and gas supplies are very
important in EU-Russia relations but also in Russia-Ukrainian relations (Ukraine is a
very large consumer of imported energy commodities). This is occasionally causing
tensions in Russia-Ukraine relations – the recent example is a conflict leading to gas
supply cuts at the turn of 2005/2006. Such conflicts are potentially dangerous for
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security of supplies to the EU which is therefore interested in basing Russia-Ukraine
energy commodity relations on stable grounds that would be mutually beneficial and
did not leave room for conflicts. 
One important event pushing Ukraine (along with other countries east of EU
borders) higher in the EU external relations agenda was 2004 EU enlargement. The
reasons behind are clear. A very recent survey by Eurobarometer (2006) confirms
the existence of large differences in the intensity of contacts and attitudes to
Ukrainians and Ukraine among EU member states. For example only 19% of
respondents from EU15 confirm that they have met people from Ukraine (compared
to 36% in case of people from Morocco, 25% from Tunisia and 21% from Algeria),
but 40% of respondents from EU member states confirm that they have encountered
Ukrainians. Another Eurobarometer question considered subjective perceptions of
selected European, Central Asian and North African countries as EU neighbours.
Interestingly, Ukraine tops the list of subjectively perceived EU neighbours with
58% of respondents in EU25 considering Ukraine as EU neighbour. Not
surprisingly, perceptions of citizens of new EU member states played an important
role in this result with 91% of Polish and 85% of Slovak respondents declaring their
perception of Ukraine as a neighbour33.
Other evidence on increased importance of Ukraine in EU’s political agenda can be
provided the he analysis of EU involvement in developments surrounding
presidential elections in Ukraine (Orange revolution: November 2004 – January
2005). EU leaders (EU High Representative for the CFSP and presidents of Poland
and Lithuania) got deeply involved in negotiations between the sides and working
out of the compromise (rerun of second round of elections). One could speculate
that this more active approach taken by the EU was linked to the EU enlargement
half a year earlier that brought the EU to the Ukrainian borders. Indeed, two EU
heads of states helping Ukrainians work out a compromise came from new EU
member states – the largest EU neighbour (Poland) and a country that shared a
Soviet past with Ukraine (Lithuania).
From the perspective of EU-Ukraine relations it is particularly significant that a group
of EU member states – Poland, Sweden, Baltic countries – has been supporting (albeit
with different conditionality attached to these positions) the idea that future EU
membership of Ukraine should not be excluded from the menu of available options.
Other member states (majority of them) have not perceived this a realistic option or
considered that it may simply be too early for any declarations concerning EU
membership perspective. As a result joint EU positions on the vision for future model
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33 Majority of EU25 citizens also view Russia (57%) and Belarus (50%) as neighbours. Subsequent places were
taken by Moldova (32%), Morocco (32%), Tunisia (28%), Georgia (28%) and Armenia (26%).
of EU relations with Ukraine have always avoided statements suggesting a possibility
that Ukraine could be regarded as a candidate for EU membership. The primary
motivation behind such a cautious approach is probably a (rational) expectation that
any declarations in this sphere would be very difficult to withdraw or that too early
commitments could erode the (already weak) political will in Ukraine for pursuing
difficult reforms necessary for making a ‘European option’ realistic.
In mid-September 2006 the European Commission has come out with negotiation
directives for a new framework agreement with Ukraine that could replace the
existing Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. Theoretically, negotiations on
the new agreement could offer a good opportunity for defining the possible changes
in the model of bilateral relations – now and in the future. It is unlikely that any
declarations on the future EU membership of Ukraine could be included in the
document. However, the EU appears to be willing to make the co-operation more
concrete, at least in the spheres that are identified as EU priorities. The information
on negotiation directives that were announced help to identify the EU priorities as
defined by the Commission. Energy is one of them and the new agreement is
suggested to contain ‘extensive provisions on energy’ (Commission, 2006a). Other
important spheres include transport, environment, and justice and security issues
(see chapter 4 of this report).
4.7.3. Prospects for EU membership?
Since the question on the EU membership perspective is likely to continue playing a
role in EU-Ukrainian relations it may be useful to briefly review current overall
approach to future EU enlargements. EU27 (after Bulgaria and Romania join the
Union in January 2007) will continue accession negotiations with two candidate
counties: Croatia and Turkey. Relatively high economic development level of Croatia
(comparable with new member states that joined in 2004 rather than Bulgaria and
Romania) makes its accession possible around 2009-2010, albeit no binding
declarations on this have been made. The prospects of negotiations with Turkey are
less clear as governments and major political forces in several EU members states
have recently expressed doubts on the prospects of Turkey’s EU membership. This is
related to several political processes in the EU (e.g. failure of the ratification process
of the Constitutional Treaty) and internal political dynamics in several member states.
As a result, the term ‘absorption capacity’ has become popular in the public debate on
EU enlargement34. There are clearly signs of an ‘enlargement fatigue’ (another
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34 Emerson et al (2006) contain an interesting discussion on the misuse of the term ‘absorption capacity’ which
– unless deconstructed into meaningful elements, should, in view of the authors, be avoided.
popular term) in the EU, making it very difficult to discuss enlargement options for
countries that were not already offered membership perspective.
One should remember that a group of countries expecting future EU membership is
already quite large. Apart from Croatia and Turkey, also Macedonia already has a
candidate status, although it has not yet started accession negotiations. Moreover,
several other Balkan countries have a ‘potential candidate’ status: Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia including Kosovo. The EU policy in the
South Eastern Europe has been shaped as a response to Balkan wars of 1990s. The
primary objective of the EU policies in the region is to secure sustainable peace,
which in turn requires on-going political, institutional, social and economic reforms.
The relations are part of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), a
mechanism somewhat similar Europe Agreements that were signed with Central and
East European countries in 1990s at the early stage of their way to EU accession in
2004. The major difference between SAP and ENP is that SAP explicitly includes
provisions on future EU membership.
Co-operation and integration process with each SAP partner country is determined
mainly by the progress in fulfilling certain political and institutional criteria and
progress in economic reforms. The framework of relations is defined in Stabilisation
and Association Agreements that so far have been signed with Croatia, Macedonia
and Albania. Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina are still negotiating
their agreements. There is also a very important economic integration dimension
related to the SAP process, which is partly realised in the contexts of another
initiative – Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe covering one ENP country –
Moldova in addition to current accession, candidate and potential candidate
countries. On the other hand, Turkey is not part of the Stability Pact. The exports
from these countries already enjoy largely free access for EU markets, while their
opening to imports from the EU is gradual. There are also advanced negotiations on
the creation of South Eastern Europe Free Trade Area (which is likely to be created
on the basis of CEFTA and a network of 27 bilateral free trade agreements). Another
important initiative led to signing a Treaty establishing the Energy Community
between the EU and South Eastern Europe. The Treaty signatories included EU,
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia
and Montenegro. Moldova has an observer status.
Between 2004 and 2007 the EU will almost double in size measured by the number of
participating countries. Besides, new member states are less developed economically.
Quite naturally such a major enlargement of the EU poses several challenges to the
efficient functioning of the Union. Institutional structure and decision making process
will need to change before any new enlargement if only because currently binding rules
only foresee solutions for the Union of up to 27 member states. Thus, there are
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objective reasons to talk about enlargement fatigue and in certain fields (e.g.
institutional framework) there are clearly problems with EU capacity to absorb new
member states35. On the other hand, among the current candidate and potential
candidate countries only Croatia has chances to join the Union in 2009-2010 whereas
remaining reform agenda in all other countries makes their accession unlikely before
2015 or so. Thus, while some changes in the EU will be needed before it can invite new
members, quite likely these will be domestic developments in countries contemplating
EU membership that will determine future shape of the Union. 
4.7.4. Issues in agriculture and energy sectors
The balance of gains from deepening economic integration between Ukraine and the
EU will depend on specific solutions adopted at sectoral level. CEPS (2006) contains
a detailed analysis of this. Not surprisingly, developments in services sector will be
particularly important for determining economic rewards. Below we focus on two
traditional sectors which may be sensitive from the EU perspective.
One sector where ensuring market access for Ukrainian products could have
significant consequences for Ukraine but also on the EU is agriculture. The key
question is on Ukraine’s ability to meet EU standards on which the EU will not be
willing to compromise. One should also realise the substantial costs of investments in
infrastructure that could enable compliance of Ukrainian food products with EU
sanitary and phytosanitary standards. The question is how to share the burden of
these costs, or more precisely to what extent the EU could be willing to support the
costly process of upgrading the standards of Ukrainian food production. The EU (and
its member states) have been financially engaged in technical assistance supporting
building the institutional capacity to cope with EU rules. An example concerning the
fisheries and focusing on a group of African countries is provided by the SFP
ACP/OCT programme36 with a budget of around 57 million EUR over 5 years. 
At the time of writing this report (October 2006) only one Ukrainian company (based in
Lviv) was put on the Third Country Establishments' List (in the category Animal Casings).
Food products of animal origin can only enter the EU if they come from an approved
establishment. A comparison with other CIS countries (Russia, Kazakhstan) indicates
that in the category ‘fish and fisheries products’ relatively many companies managed to
get approval for being enlisted among third country establishments37. 
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35 Similar point was recently made by Jose Manuel Barroso, president of the EU Commission – see ‘EU chief
urges enlargement pause’, BBC News, 25 September 2006.
36 http://www.sfp-acp.org
37 The full list is available at http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/third_en.htm
The action plan lists a number of specific activities in the sphere of sanitary and
phytosanitary issues that should be tackled (article 32). Generally, it envisages
carrying analyses of Ukrainian legislation and implementation capacity in this field
with a view defining steps that could lead to veterinary and phytosanitary agreements.
In view of this it is possible that the ENPI can contain technical assistance component
related to veterinary and phytosanitary issues. It appears reasonable to expect that
Ukrainian requests and suggestions concerning the scope and modalities of technical
assistance in this field (if clearly spelled out on the basis of the proper assessment of
needs) could be take into account leading to optimal design of assistance.
Another sector where Ukraine plays a role in broader EU’s policies covering several
countries is energy. Increasing EU dependence on imported gas and oil and signs that
energy commodities have been increasingly used as tools for exerting political
influence by some commodity exporters have motivated renewed EU interest in
working out a common external energy policy (Commission, 2006b). Relations with
Russia play a key role in this initiative, with EU trying to persuade Russia to ratify
Energy Charter Treaty and the Transit Protocol. Another important aspects concern
opening of energy sector to foreign investors enabling investment in production and
transit capacity, and domestic energy pricing and energy efficiency in countries such
Russia or Ukraine. Experience with functioning of the Energy Community between
the EU and South Eastern Europe may offer interesting models for shaping co-
operation in the energy fields also with CIS countries.
4.7.5. Conclusions
Summing up, from the EU perspective Ukraine is an important partner in the political
dialogue, just as several other partner countries covered either by the accession process,
SAP or ENP. In the next few years it appears unlikely that Ukraine could be offered
membership perspective. Future EU policy towards enlargement can evolve depending
primarily on experience with functioning of the enlarged EU on one hand and reform
progress in countries interested in membership on the other. ENP offers a flexible basis
for Ukraine’s shaping bilateral relations with the EU. This can be viewed as a chance
but also as a challenge since much will depend on Ukrainian initiative, and its ability to
foster ambitious reform agenda. However, there are good prospects for deepening of
economic integration with the EU. The coverage of the expected free trade agreement
will be important in determining economic gains for both sides. From the EU
perspective co-operation in the field of energy is particularly important. 
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Progress and problems encountered in implementation of
the economic part of the action plan
The implementation of the economic articles of the action plan to date (mid-2006)
shows that in some areas, connected mainly with external liberalization, Ukraine has
progressed substantially. These are primarily trade and financial liberalisation. In
areas, related mostly to the difficult structural reforms, not much success was noticed.
In some extreme cases, policies even led to the deterioration of economic conditions.
The situation now calls for concentrating efforts on domestic reforms, alongside
finalising efforts aimed at WTO entry.
Domestic reforms should be the first priority. If the economy is open and the internal
market is not liberalised, the country can be severely affected in case of adverse
external shock. This is to say that in the case of Ukraine, there is the need for action
in the following areas: 
• There is a scope for the improvement of fiscal sustainability of the country. Last
years’ pension rises led to the accumulation of large deficit in the Pension Fund.
Given that the Ukraine demography is the worst in Europe, and that the pension
system is still based on the solidarity principle, additional Pension Fund deficits
should be avoided in the future at all costs. Future obligations will be high anyway.
• The independence of the central bank is to be strengthened, if Ukraine wants to
adhere to its earlier declarations about changing the monetary policy goal and
switch to direct inflation targeting.
• The governments should not revert to the old practice of price controls. In the
situation of volatile inflation rates and external liberalisation, fixing prices may
have an adverse effect on the economy. It  not only add to inflation expectations,
but also to uncertainty regarding the general economic policy, as perceived by
the producers and consumers.
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5
Conclusions and policy
recommendations
• Attempts to create stable and friendly conditions for investment are worth being
made.
• The pace of privatisation of state-owned enterprises should be higher.
• The much needed law on state aid should be adopted. The estimate of state aid
granted to enterprises is very high with the major part of it in an indirect form.
Such situation is particularly harmful to competition. It would be thus desirable
to have the state aid under one jurisdiction.
• There is also a need to improve public procurement practices; and
• to pass the law on joint stock companies and other relevant laws that would
guarantee property rights for players at the domestic financial market and the
development of the market itself.
Options of future economic integration between the EU
and Ukraine
When thinking about the exact form of the economic integration that is going to take
place between the EU and Ukraine during the next 5-10 years, a typical EU’s FTA in
manufacturing sector is the most realistic option. Assuming that such FTA is started
to be implemented in 2008, it can take as long as 10 more years before the trade in
manufacturing products is fully liberalised. However, it is both in the interest of the
Commission and the Ukraine authorities that the transition period is shorter.
While the EU-Ukraine free trade in manufacturing goods is unlikely to result directly
in high welfare gains, it would help in changing the structure of Ukraine’s economy
and support its long-term development making it at the same time more hospitable for
foreign investment. As the WTO membership is a precondition for Ukraine before
signing an FTA with the EU, any actions that would support Ukraine’s efforts to join
WTO are worth considering.
Looking beyond a standard FTA it would be in the interest of both the EU and Ukraine
to extend coverage of an agreement, to something that could be called an FTA+, such
as the one described in the recent feasibility study on the EU-Ukraine FTA (CEPS,
2006, pp. 126-127). Depending on other circumstances it may be advisable to promote
such more ambitious agenda even at an early stage of FTA negotiations. The FTA+
package should include, among other, the following actions:
• support to customs service reform (an ambitious agenda was set in the EU-
Ukraine action plan; however the functioning of the customs service remains
huge barrier to trade);
• harmonisation and mutual recognition of standards reducing non-tariff barriers
to trade;
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• the adoption of agri-food standards (with the complete integration in the sphere
of agriculture impossible, this can lower barriers to trade, develop agricultural
internal market and reduce scope for phyto-sanitary concerns);
• removing restrictions to capital mobility and opening Ukraine’s financial
services market;
• support for better implementation of competition policy – convergence with EU
practices; (relatively good competition law is in practice not implemented or
used very selectively);
• support for implementation of good corporate governance in Ukraine (that is
a problem issue at present).
Deeper free trade would boost the development of processing industries in Ukraine,
and could lead to a major growth of intra-industry trade with the EU, as Ukraine
would become incorporated in the European supply chain.
There is also a scope for further integration in the network industries, such as energy,
telecommunications and transport. Upgrading infrastructure and enhancing
competition in the infrastructure sectors will be the major challenges for Ukraine and,
therefore, should be the focus of the EU assistance. If successful, such integration can
bring significant gains to the EU and Ukrainian actors.
In the most ambitious scenario something like an ‘EEA light’ could become an option
worth considering, albeit in a more distant future. If such an option happened, it
could potentially bring large benefits. Experience of CEE countries suggest that these
benefits for Ukraine could be in the range of 3-9% of GDP. They would come from the
reduction in border costs and non-tariff barriers. 
Besides this, the extent of Ukraine’s integration in the European market is going to be
limited, at least for the near future, as it is unlikely to create a customs union with the
EU. As a result, border costs and costs related to the proof of the rules of origin will
remain. Also, the investments needed to comply with the EU standards and
regulations have to be carefully distributed over time so as to downplay the high costs
of compliance in the short term.
Challenges on both sides
Looking beyond liberalisation of trade in manufacturing goods, the main challenges
at the moment rest in the sphere of easing capital mobility, removing restrictions on
the movement of labour and offering proper incentives by the EU.
Easing short-term capital flows make a challenge for Ukraine. The country has
already made reasonable progress in liberalizing direct investment flows. Now the
challenge is to carefully sequence future liberalization of capital flows and, more
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important, start such liberalization in a concerted effort with introducing inflation
targeting and broader financial sector reform agenda.
Macroeconomic performance and institutional capacities of the financial market
regulators allow to begin liberalization of capital flows in the nearest future. First of
all, a new framework law regulating trans-border capital flows is needed to replace the
current numerous idiosyncratic regulations. A new law should unambiguously declare
free capital mobility and absence of control of any kind as an ultimate objective of
liberalization. Stock market operations, long-term credits, purchase of real estate for
investments and restrictions on other long-term flows can be eased already in 2007.
Simultaneously with the liberalisation of the short-term flows, the central bank should
work to introduce risk based supervision of financial institutional and enhances
internal capacity to forecast and manage volatile flows. This will require coordination
of liberalization policy with introducing inflation targeting and broader financial
sector development program. We believe that it is realistic to implement all
complementary measures within the next three years so that by 2009 Ukraine can
have regulation of capital flows coherent with OECD standards provided convertible
currency combined with inflation targeting.
The idea of legalising large labour migration from Ukraine is not new. Although
sustainable economic growth in Ukraine can limit the motivation for looking for
work abroad, the numbers of Ukrainian (often illegal) labour migration are high.
Intensive labour emigration has become an important element of transition process
in Ukraine since early 1990s. According to different estimates, the overall number of
Ukrainian migrants working abroad equals to 0.8-2 million persons. Despite this, the
issue has never been given proper attention by Ukrainian authorities. All initiatives
up to date have not been efficient in addressing the problems of labour emigration.
Given intensive migratory outflows to the labour market of several EU Member
States, the Ukrainian government’s priority should be to intensify analytical and
regulatory work necessary to settle the migration-related problem. There are several
possible options of labour migration policy that can be implemented by Ukraine
within short period of time unilaterally or in cooperation with the EU. In particular,
Ukraine may negotiate preferential access of Ukrainian workers engaged at least in
some types of occupations to the EU labour market on bilateral basis with individual
Member States as well as agreements on coordination of social protection of
Ukrainian workers legally employed in the EU. Ukraine’s joining WTO should also
be perceived as a necessary step toward further liberalization of movement of
workers among Ukraine and the EU. All these measures should be implemented as a
part of a long-run strategy of labour market reforms.
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Looking from the EU perspective Ukraine is an important partner in the political
dialogue, just as several other partner countries covered either by the accession
process, SAP or ENP. In the next few years it appears unlikely that Ukraine could be
offered membership perspective. Future EU policy towards enlargement can evolve
depending primarily on experience with functioning of the enlarged EU on one hand
and reform progress in countries interested in membership on the other, on which
Ukraine has little influence. However, the ENP offers a flexible basis for Ukraine’s
shaping bilateral relations with the EU. This can be viewed as a chance but also as a
challenge since much will depend on Ukrainian initiative, and its ability to foster
ambitious reform agenda.
ENPI can provide sufficient resources for financing projects that important for both
sides. Nevertheless, the extent to which Ukraine will be able to use the full potential
of ENPI will be partly determined by the ability of the country to formulate and
promote its priorities.
107
PROSPECTS FOR EU-UKRAINE ECONOMIC RELATIONS
CASE Reports No. 66
108
Małgorzata Jakubiak, Anna Kolesnichenko (eds.)
CASE Reports No. 66
Annex 1. Measurement of CBI
Typically, central bank independence implies whether central bank can freely (i)
define its policy goals and (ii) choose instruments to achieve these goals. One also
refers to ‘legal’ independence as central bank freedom formally allowed by the
legislation as opposed to ‘actual’ independence  i.e. what we observe in reality and
how the laws are enforced in practice.
Basic EU standards
Two documents set a broader concept of central bank independence in EU
countries: 
1. The Maastricht Treaty – basic notions38 regarding independence of the ECB and
EMU Members CBs .
2. The Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European
central Bank provides more rigorous and comprehensive description of CBI
principles in EMU.
In particular, the Maastricht Treaty39 the basic rule regarding CBI suggests that:
when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred
upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor
a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies
shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from
any government of a Member State or from any other body. The
Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member
States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the
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38 Title VI ‘Economic and Monetary Policy’.
39 Article 107.
6
Annexes
members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national
central banks in the performance of their tasks.
The analysis below relying on Cukierman index imply that neither the NBU, nor the
Ukrainian government fully satisfy the criterion, both ‘legally’ and de facto.  However,
limited NBU freedom is noticeable even without resorting to a formal analysis. For
instance, in April 2005 the NBU pressed by the government sharply appreciated
nominal hryvnia exchange rate.  .
Measuring NBU independence with the Cukierman Index40
The Cukierman index is conventionally used to measure independence of a central
bank. The Cukierman index consists of components:
(i) Chief executive officer (CEO) of CB;
(ii) Policy formulation;
(iii) Central bank objectives;
(iv) Limitations on lending.
Each component, in turn, contains one to 8 items. Points from 0 to 1 are assigned to
each item. Final value of the index is an average of points of all items.
Similar analysis of the NBU independence was conducted by Schwoediauer et al.
(2006) recently. Here our own conclusions are presented and points are compared
with those from Schwoediauer et al. (2006).
• As mentioned above, all procedures regarding CEO of the monetary authority is
the first part of the Cukierman index. And term of office is the first part in it. The
Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine has 5-year term of office. This fulfil
requirement of ESCB and ECB Statute, which call for minimum 5 years term of
office for the monetary authority governor. At the same time, according to
Cukierman approach, the ideal term of office constitutes 8 years. Therefore,
numerical value for this item in the Cukierman index equals 0.625 for Ukraine.
• Appointment procedure of the CEO of the monetary authority comes next in the
Cukierman index. ESCB and ECB Statute stipulates for the appointment of the
ECB CEO by the Governments of the Member States on the recommendation of
the Council (it has to consult the European Parliament and Governing Council
before that) (Article 11.2). Simultaneously, no precise procedures are determined
regarding appointment of CEO of CB of the Member states. According to
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40 Very detailed information on the Cukierman Index is from Dvorsky (2000).
Cukierman, the highest score should gain countries where CEO is appointed by
the central bank board or by a council composed of members from executive,
legislative branches and the CB board. Subsequently, Ukrainian legislation does
not fit any of these requirements: Head of the NBU is appointed by the Parliament
on proposition of the President. Following reasoning in Dvorski (2000), we assign
0.5 for Ukraine for this item.
• The Statute of the ESCB and ECB defines that CEO of the CB may be relieved
from the office by the Court of Justice in case he/she does not fulfill the
conditions required for the performance of his duties of if he/she has been guilty
of ‘serious misconduct’. Cukierman’s methodology requires legislation contains
no provision for the potential dismissal of CEO. According to the Law ‘On the
NBU’ the Governor of the National Bank could be dismissed by the Parliament
on proposition of the President. The cases of such proposition are limited to
nonpolitical issues (such as termination of term of office, death, etc.) but also
contain such paragraph: ‘on proposition of the President within his/her
constitutional authorities’. Apparently, this creates the possibility to dismiss the
CEO with no apparent and significant reason (this was the case when Stelmah
was dismissed at the end of 2002). Taking this into account, we assign only one
third of the maximum for this item of Cukierman index.
• According to the law ‘On the National Bank of Ukraine’ employees of the NBU
are not allowed to take any position in the government, business, etc. (article 65
of the law), which corresponds to EU legislation and the Cukierman
methodology. Therefore, maximum score (1) is assigned for this item.
• Ukrainian legislation does not give unambiguous answers to the questions from
‘Policy Formulation’ part of the index. According to the law ‘On the National
Bank of Ukraine’ the Council of the NBU is responsible for the preparation of
the ‘The General Principles of the Monetary Policy’ for the next year. Further
activities of the Board of the NBU should be in line with these Principles.
Although the Council is not eligible to intervene into the ‘everyday activities’ of
the Board, it is entitled to impose a ‘delayed’ veto on the decisions of the Board
in order to guarantee execution of the Principles. Due to quite diverse staff of the
Council (see above) such authorities may be treated as those that restrict the
NBU ability to formulate its goals independently. Although the Council does not
use its veto authority in practice (because of lack of quorum) it seems logically
to assign only half of points to this item.
• The NBU has the right to decide on goals and instruments for their reaching
itself. However, as recent events showed, the government and other authorities
may influence decisions of the NBU (drastic hryvnia appreciation in April 2005
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could serve as evidence). Also there are other potential areas for the conflicts
including distribution of the NBU revenues. Moreover, conflicts between the
NBU and the government could emerge and their resolution is quite vague in
practice. Therefore, 0.5 points are to be scored to this item.
• According to the Cukierman procedure, coordination of the NBU with the
government is about participation of the former in the preparation of the budget.
As the participation of the NBU in the budget preparation in Ukraine is quite
meager, we assign zero to this item.
• Cukierman determines that maximum score on the statutory objectives of the CB
should be assigned if ‘prices stability’ is the main and the only goal of the
monetary authority. However, according to the Constitution of Ukraine and the
law ‘On the NBU’, its primary responsibility is ‘maintaining national currency
stability’. It also should contribute to Prices stability but this is not a primary
goal. Moreover, as noted before, key principles of the policy directions are
determined by the Council that could politically biased. Therefore, only one forth
of the maximum score may be given at this item.
• Ukrainian law ‘On the National Bank pf Ukraine’ bans the NBU direct lending
to the government (Article 54 of the law). Subsequently, we assign maximum
score to the first point of the forth section of the index while skipping other ones
of ‘Limitations on Lending’ section. Therefore, rest of the ‘Limitations on
lending’ is skipped.
Therefore, total score for the Cukierman index, which calculated as arithmetic
average, equals 0.52 (see Table 1). This is somewhat lower than the value calculated
by Blue Ribbon Commission experts (0.69) but higher than the figure got by foreign
experts (0.42)41 (see Table 2). The result could be interpreted as that ‘degree of
independence’ of the NBU is only 52% from ideal case and further reforms are
obviously needed to guarantee better CBI in Ukraine.
It should be noted scores for other developed countries (e.g. USA and UK) are also low
sometimes (see Table 2). On the one hand this means that their monetary authority is
not as independent as one might expect (if so, this by far could be treated as disproof
of the fact that CB independence leads to better macroeconomic and inflation
performance). On the other hand, the index should be interpreted with some caution.
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41 Although this value was calculated in 2000 the figures are comparable since the new law ‘On the NBU’ came
into effect in 1999.
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*In Schwoediauer et al. (2006) weighted average is used to calculate the index (maximum weight 0.5 is given to
the forth item, CEO section got 0.2, while second and third parts got only 0.15 each.). Interestingly such
weights result in a bit higher index value of 0.73. Here we calculate total index basing on arithmetic average
using their primary scores to each item in order to compare with our estimates.
Source: Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (1992);
Treaty on European Union (1992); Dvorsky (2000); Schwoediauer et al. (2006); CASE Ukraine estimates.
Table 1A. Legal CB independence (Cukierman index)
Item
of Cukierman
index
Ideal value
of Cukierman
index
Ideal valueaccording
to the Maastricht
Treaty
Value for Ukraine
Value for the
item of the
index for
Ukraine
Points,
assigned by
the UNDP*
1. Chief Executive Officer
Terms of office
of the CEO 8 years
5 years
minimum 5 years 0.625 0.5
Appointment
procedure
of the CEO
appointed by
the central
bank board
n/a
appointment by
the Parliament on
proposition of 
the President
0.5 0.5
Dismissal
of the CEO
legislation
should contain
no provision
for the potential
dismissal
of CEO
may be relieved from
the office by the Court
of Justice in case
he/she does not fulfill
the conditions
required for the
performance of his
duties of if he/she has
been guilty of 'serious
misconduct'.
dismissal by
the Parliament
on proposition
of the President
0.33 0.17
Incompatibility
clauses
employees of CB
are not allowed to
take any position
in the government,
business, etc
employees of CB
are not allowed
to take any position
in the government,
business, etc
employees of the NBU
are not allowed to
take any position
in the government,
business, etc
1 1
2. Policy Formulation
CB authority
to formulate
monetary policy
Independently Independently
Certain authorities
of the Council restrict
the NBU ability to for
mulate its goals
0.5 1
Regulation
of the conflicts
between CB
and the
government
no official legal
provision as to
regulation of conflicts
between the NBU
and the government
0.5 1
Coordination
with
the government
Active
participation
of CB in the budge
t formulation
n/a
participation of the
NBU in the budget
preparation
in Ukraine
is quite meager
0 0
3. Central Bank Objectives
Statutory
objectives of CB
“prices stability”
is the main and
the only goal of
the monetary
authority
The primary objective
of the ESCB should
be to maintain price
stability
The primary objective
of he NBU
is maintaining
national currency
stability
0.25 0.4
4. Limitations on Lending
CB credit to the
government in the
form of advances
Prohibition
of direct lending
of the government
Prohibition
of direct lending
of the
government
Prohibition
of bans the NBU
direct lending
to the government
1 1
CB credit to the
government in the
form of securities
n/a 1
Who decides 
to control of terms
of lending
to government
n/a 1
The circle of potential
borrowers n/a 0.7
Types of limits on
direct credits from CB n/a 1
Maximum maturity
of credit n/a 0.4
Annex 2. Bilateral employment agreements concluded
by Ukraine
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Source: Simone Polillo and Mauro F. Guillén, ‘Globalization Pressures and the State: The Global Spread of
Central Bank Independenc’, American Journal of Sociology 110(6) (May 2005):1764-1802.
Table 2A. Cukierman index in selected countries in 2000
Germany 0.92
Poland 0.89
Czech Republic 0.73
Hungary 0.67
Russia 0.49
USA 0.48
UK 0.47
Ukraine 0.42
Country
Date
of signatory
Type of work permit
Maximum period
of work permit
Quota specified
General employment permit
1 year (extension
up to 1.5 year) No quota
Poland 16.02.1994 Contract workers providing export
construction or other services under
agreements between companies
of both states.
2 years (extension
up to 2.5 year)
No quota
Long term permits
1 year (extension
up to 1.5 years) 200 persons
Seasonal work permits
6 months (one time
during a year) 300 persons
Slovakia 07.03.1997
Permits for employees who fulfill
commercial contracts between
among natural or legal entities
of both states.
2 years (extension
up to 3 years and
up to 4 years
for managers)
1800 persons
Long term permits
1 year (extension
possible)
Defined annually according
to protocol depending
on labour market situation
Seasonal work permits
6 months (one time
during a year)
Chech
Republic
21.03.1996
Permits for employees who fulfill
commercial contracts between
natural or legal entities
of both states.
Not specified
General employment permit
1 year (extension
up to 1.5 year)
No quota, annual quotas
may be introduced in response
to persisting problems in the
labour market
Lithuania 28.03.1995
Permits for employees who fulfill
commercial contracts between
natural or legal entities
of both states.
2 years (extension
up to 2.5 year)
General employment permit Not specified
Quantitative restrictions may
be imposed. Notice must be
made one month prior
to introduction
Latvia 13.02.3002
Permits for employees who fulfill
commercial contracts between
natural or legal entities
of both states.
Portugal 13.02.3002 General employment permit 1 year No quota
Annex 3. Number of work permits provided for emigrants
from Ukraine to EU
Annex 4. Distribution of legal Ukrainian migrant
workers across countries of EU-25
Annex 5. Number of legal Ukrainian labour migrants
in Check Republic according to different sources
(ths, persons)
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Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.
Employed (total) EU-15 EU-10
year
persons % persons % persons %
1996 11 816 100 5 227 44,2 3 457 29,3
1997 18 741 100 6 768 36,1 5 012 26,7
1998 24 397 100 9 735 39,9 7 949 32,6
1999 28 224 100 11 633 41,2 9 395 33,3
2000 33 735 100 15 744 46,7 5 056 15,0
2001 36 329 100 18 465 50,8 5 404 14,9
2002 40 683 100 19 701 48,4 8 144 20,0
2003 38 161 100 19 957 52,3 7 855 20,6
2004 45 727 100 18 022 39,4 13 316 29,1
2005 56 549 100 20 301 35,9 16 141 28,5
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.
% of EU-25
year
Greece Cyprus UK Latvia Malta Germany Spain
Chech
Republic other
1996 56,8 27,8 1,4 0,0 0,1 1,6 0,0 3,9 8,3
1997 48,4 4,0 2,0 0,0 3,2 4,2 0,1 27,9 10,2
1998 41,4 6,7 4,2 0,0 0,5 3,6 0,3 35,2 8,0
1999 41,0 13,5 4,4 0,5 4,4 6,1 0,3 23,2 6,6
2000 54,6 20,9 13,1 0,5 0,0 6,6 0,7 0,0 3,7
2001 52,1 20,9 14,7 0,3 0,0 5,2 4,2 0,0 2,7
2002 50,8 22,5 8,2 1,3 2,5 5,0 3,4 1,7 4,7
2003 48,8 20,8 9,9 3,2 2,1 5,6 3,3 1,0 5,2
2004 33,1 31,9 16,3 5,7 1,9 2,8 2,4 1,2 4,8
2005 32,1 32,9 14,7 5,4 3,1 2,6 2,6 0,8 5,8
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, International migration trends, OECD, SOPEMI edition.
2000 2001 2002 2003
Statistics office of Check Republic 15.8 17.5 20.0 20.1
Statistics office of Ukraine 3,5 1,2 0,5 0,3
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